

**Annotated Bibliography**  
on the nexus of  
**Relief/ Development Aid**  
and  
**Violent Conflict in Sri Lanka.**  
Wolfram Zunzer

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Contact Address:

Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies  
Sri Lanka Office  
53/2, Gregory's Road,  
Colombo 07, Sri Lanka.

Tel: (+94)1-669710/11

Tel: (+94)1-669712

<http://www.berghof-center.org>

For comments and updates, please contact Wolfram Zunzer directly ([wzunzer@gmx.de](mailto:wzunzer@gmx.de)) or the  
Research Department of Berghof Foundation Sri Lanka Office ([bergres@sltnet.lk](mailto:bergres@sltnet.lk)).

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## Foreword

In 2001 the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies was asked to organize the implementation of a “Resource Network for Conflict Studies and Transformation” (RNCST) in Sri Lanka. The purpose of the RNCST is to contribute to conflict transformation by strengthening and complementing the existing structures and capacities for research, training and dialogue within the country. It is funded by the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, and is based on a Memorandum-of-Understanding with the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.

The creation of the RNCST reflects an increasing awareness within the international community that new kinds of assistance are needed to address protracted ethnopolitical conflicts. The first actors who started to discuss in depth the need for this new kind of assistance were bilateral and multilateral development and relief agencies. The reasons are obvious: Violent conflicts destroy and undermine development and they became one of the main reasons for relief work. What kind of development work is needed to enhance the political and societal capacities for dealing constructively with conflicts and diversity? How can development and relief agencies prevent that their resources unintentionally enhance the rivalry of groups or are used for prolonging violence and exclusion?

Sri Lanka with its violent conflict of nearly two decades in the Northeast was one of the first countries where these and similar questions were addressed by donor agencies, International Organizations, governmental and academic institutions and concerned individuals. The result is an impressive number of studies dealing with the nexus of relief/development aid and conflict in Sri Lanka. According to the research of Wolfram Zunzer altogether 43 publications can be identified which were produced or published in the last three years.

For most practitioners and even for most academics inside or outside of Sri Lanka it is difficult to read all these studies. Therefore we thought it will be useful to put together an annotated bibliography to facilitate the access to the topics dealt with, the research results achieved and the conclusions reached at. Quite often annotated bibliographies make a very dry reading. To prevent this we have encouraged the author not only to order the studies according to their main perspectives but also to review them critically and to order them according to their quality in his assessment. Other reviewers and readers might come to different assessments. Our main objective is to broaden the knowledge about the “state-of-the-art” in this field and to stimulate further explorations on the nexus between development/relief aid and conflict in Sri Lanka.

This is the first “Working Paper” of the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies Sri Lanka Office. We would like to thank Wolfram Zunzer for his refreshing and comprehensive overview and Sandamalie Gammampila for her diligent layout work to start this new series of publications.

March 2002

Dr Norbert Ropers  
Director  
Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies  
Sri Lanka Office



# Table of Contents

- Introduction..... 1
- Bibliography/Alphabetical Order..... 5
- Annotated Bibliography / Ordered by Quality..... 13
- II.1 Foreign Policy Perspective of Donors  
and their Critiques..... 15
- II.2 Policy formulating and Implementing  
with regard to Rehabilitation and Peacebuilding..... 27
- II.3 Development Cooperation Perspective  
for Societal Transformation of Violet Conflicts..... 39
- II.4 Humanitarian Aid for Reconciliation Perspective..... 63



## Introduction

On an international level, Boutros Ghali's 'Agenda for Peace', published in 1992 can be seen as a starting point for the increasing attention paid to the role of long-lasting violent conflicts not only by foreign offices worldwide but also by development cooperation agencies. Meanwhile, the conflict sensitivity of many donors has increased. On the one hand, diverse multilateral and bilateral donors are working on the impact of violent conflict on development cooperation, albeit on a more general level, and thereby drawing much attention in the public. On the other hand, the question, how results of research activities and of largely internal agency discourses on conflict prevention and transformation can be put into practice, remains to be seen. In any case, there is a chance for bilateral donors to use and expand their country specific expertise to develop politically feasible programming measures and project practices, which have a peace building impact on the level of development projects and in civil society. In Sri Lanka, an increasing number of donors have shown their willingness to take their project procedures a step further, shifting from working around the conflict to working on the conflict. As the potentials and boundaries of peace building measures can only be tested in practice, it is nevertheless important to develop a coherent policy framework and policy formulating process including national and international stakeholders, as well as to improve the donor co-ordination. With the development of the Policy Framework for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation (RRR) as a joint endeavour of the Sri Lankan Government, international donors and local NGOs, an important first step was made.

### **The origin of the reports and the perspective taken by the reviewer**

Given this background, it is not particularly surprising that in the last 3 years a number of highly interesting papers on the nexus of relief/development cooperation and violent conflict have been published in Sri Lanka. Originating from specialists at the embassies, bilateral and multilateral donor organizations, international organizations, international NGOs as well as from the Sri Lankan Government, local NGOs and university departments. Altogether 43 publications directly related to the issue were identified. The driving factors for this large number of publications can be seen in a growing awareness amongst donors that questions of economic development, poverty alleviation, and human rights cannot be dealt with, while ignoring the relationship between the conflict in Sri Lanka and questions of governance.

The preparation of this first annotated bibliography on development aid and conflict in Sri Lanka should not be seen as a full or comprehensive exercise, as not all publications of the involved organizations were accessible and the few publications related to the topic from before 1997 were not taken into account. Nevertheless, the 'gray literature' was covered extensively, and a core of 24 reports, many of which are final draft versions, were reviewed. This makes the knowledge base especially timely, but demands a certain sensitivity from the reader with regard to obtaining permission before quoting the papers marked as draft versions.

The position taken by the reviewer regarding the field of development aid and violent conflict in Sri Lanka and for commenting on the reports, can probably best be described in terms of an 'educated pragmatism', neither ignoring the multiple pitfalls nor neglecting the potentials for peacebuilding presently at stake. With regard to the debate amongst donors about joining a short-term decision-making oriented foreign policy perspective with a politically more conscious development cooperation perspective, focusing on a sustainable societal transformation to reduce causes of the multiple conflicts in Sri Lanka, one can be modestly optimistic. But a much larger challenge is the need to build up more personal trust between external and internal, state and non-state actors and to link organization processes accordingly. A more optimistic outlook in this regard would be to conceptualize policy formulation and implementation for conflict transformation in Sri Lanka as a multiplicity of joint learning processes between a variety of actors working on related issues but feeding into each other. An intelligible integration of the donor discourses and the RRR process, subsequently extending the number of civil society and state actors involved, could support and help to integrate indigenous peacebuilding initiatives.

### **The literature and how it is made accessible**

In the first part of this annotated bibliography, all 43 titles are listed in alphabetical order. Aiming to cover the field extensively, not only publications contributing to the formulation of policies with regard to rehabilitation and peacebuilding were taken into account, but contributions focusing on the macro- and micro level of the multidimensional conflicts in Sri Lanka were also included. The ones marked as "Reviewed" refer to the second part of the annotated bibliography, in which 24 reports are reviewed. These reviews consist of a summary according to the paper's structure, the main arguments, the methodology used, and comments on the relevance in the larger field of development aid and violent conflict in Sri Lanka. In the course of

summarizing and critically commenting on the publications, four major perspectives were delineated:

- Foreign Policy Perspective of Donors and their Critiques
- Policy Formulating and Implementing Perspective with regard to Rehabilitation and Peacebuilding
- Development Cooperation Perspective for Societal Transformation of Violent Conflicts
- Humanitarian Aid for Reconciliation Perspective

The second part is ordered according to these four perspectives. Therefore, titles were selected, assessed on the quality of each report and put into a top-down ranking. The central factors for assessing the quality of the reports were:

- special contribution to the debate
- theoretical comprehensiveness
- empirical adequacy of the approach taken
- readability

The three best papers in each of the four perspectives were commented upon in a comparative perspective, describing the most important advantages and disadvantages in relation to each other.



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in alphabetical order



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# **I. Annotated Bibliography**

ranked according to a personal quality

assessment of the reviewer in descending order



## II.1 Foreign Policy Perspective of Donors and their Critiques

Kuperus, P. (2000): *Conflict and Development*, Colombo, Dutch Embassy, 1 September 2000.

### Table of Contents

1. The need for a more systematic approach
2. Resolution and transformation
3. The Polarization of views and of the public debate
  - 3.1 The Internal dimension
  - 3.2 Perceptions of external concerns and interests
4. Breaking the deadlock
5. Framework and architecture

In the first section, the author calls for a more systematic approach for contributing to conflict resolution through development aid, e.g. by making it an explicit objective of the Netherlands development cooperation in Sri Lanka. In the second section, Kuperus describes the social and political preconditions, especially the shortcomings with regard to active and responsible political actors and the lack of a coherent strategy and framework for the different audiences, issues and actors involved. Especially, the separated nature of the state initiated discourse to establish a framework for relief, rehabilitation and reconciliation and the donor organized discourses on improving planning and programming of development assistance with regard to conflict transformation, is outlined and an integration of both asked for. A conceptual shortcoming of the donor sponsored attempts to integrate development interventions, good governance, human rights, and social integration is the absence of a clear vision on how to effect changes in mutual attitudes of the opposing groups in Sri Lankan society. In the third section, Kuperus describes the polarization of views and of the public debate. How the parties to the conflict view each other through ideological lenses has turned into an independent force of its own in the public. Therefore "deconstructing" these ideologies is an essential attempt to resolving the conflict. A politically dominant Sinhala Buddhist culture, a largely deficient political culture and the exclusion of alternative opinions and production of common ethnic stereotypes are at the heart of the perceived deadlock between the parties to the conflict. The author

then identifies 7 political issues from public debate, which provide entry points for conflict resolution and transformation, ranging from the unbalanced economic development to the nature of the LTTE. Furthermore, he delineates the ideological lenses of the national political actors by describing their perceptions of external concerns and interests. Summarizing the publicly discussed issues and perceptions from the point of view of the resolution and transformation of the conflict, the author regards the absence of an open and structured political and security dialogue between all partners involved, as a most striking feature in the political realm. As conditions hardly permit an open exchange of experiences and views on the political level, Kuperus describes the yet largely uncoordinated efforts in the scientific domain as one possible starting point that might feed into a widening social debate in the country. A comprehensive approach to transforming the conflict in Sri Lanka must focus on ideological, and political factors underlying the present conflict and a mix of measures that changes the political culture and the system of governance.

In the fourth section, it is described what issues have to be addressed to overcome the deadlock of recurring cycles of distrust between political groupings: a strengthening of public debate, the identification of major constraints and challenging the status quo with respect to policies, institutions or programs. Thereby, a change of mindsets and a shift of consensus could be reached.

In the fifth section (framework and architecture), recommendations on the policy and on the practical level are given. Important goals for an multi-track approach to conflict resolution in Sri Lanka, have to be: resolving ideological stalemate; support for general policy measures improving economic performance, governance, and civil society; including a regional and international dialogue. He calls for a more thorough mapping of peace building opportunities and capacities, for the strengthening of local capacities for research into development and conflict resolution on a national level, as well as an increased donor coordination focusing both on incentives and disincentives on the international level. Concrete measures to build up infrastructure for conflict management comprise: an early warning mechanism to monitor problematic issues; human capacity building through improved inclusion of peacebuilding issues and co-ordination efforts into the seminars of international research institutions such as LSE/London, ZEF/Bonn, Clingendael /The-Hague; coordination of peace constituencies such as fostering multi-ethnic interests groups, forums for an open discussion of conflict issues, educational and cultural activities, specialized NGOs for reconciliation and trauma, community oriented micro-projects. The annex describes internal and external dimensions, which foster and stabilize the conflict. On the former issues like the ethnic divide, the political process and political culture, governance and human rights as well as modernization and cultural dimensions are covered, while the latter is about how the role of the West and India are internally perceived.

## Main Argument / Methodology

Seeking to promote sustainable development, good governance and human rights, donors have become more pro-active in responding to the underlying causes of the violent conflicts in Sri Lanka. But as a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution requires more than development resources alone, development cannot be separated from the political environment, the political culture and issues of governance. Presently, the government led process of establishing a Framework for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation (RRR) and the development of operational guidelines for planning and programming by a number of development agencies are taking place in a largely separated manner. The author underscores that both developments must be seen as complementary in pursuing the same objectives and ways must be found that they may strengthen and feed into each other.

Methodologically, this report is based on an analysis of different cultural and political perceptions and underlying interests of mainly national political actors and how these determine political processes and the quality of governance. Empirically, it is based on the personal experience of the author working at the Dutch Embassy in Colombo.

### Comment

Starting with an improved approach to conflict as well as a thorough analysis of the internal cultural and political dimensions, which contribute to the ongoing multi-level conflict in Sri Lanka, Kuperus has managed to lay the first stone for a really comprehensive approach for analyzing and transforming deadlocks of conflict transformation attempts in Sri Lanka. It integrates development interventions, good governance, and social integration measures with the political goal to foster the development of a clear vision on how to effect changes in mutual attitudes of the opposing groups in Sri Lanka. One methodological shortcoming is the focus on perceptions of national political actors, which are not properly identified, extrapolating more general assumptions about the political system. Its very strength in comparison to all other reports is certainly the meaningful and in-depth description of the political process and what makes the political culture in Sri Lanka special, without losing eyesight on practical steps to be taken for transforming the conflict. From a foreign policy perspective of the Dutch government, the author has written an important contribution to the debate on integrating track 1 diplomacy with an multi-dimensional analysis of political and societal shortcomings, which makes it more substantial than Smith's (2001) paper, which only focuses on the level of large donors. With regard to Bastian's (2001) critical approach it has the advantage of being empirically more comprehensive and also generating some concrete recommendations for conflict transformation.

**Smith / DFID (2001): Donor Aid Instruments and Conflict in Sri Lanka, London.**

**Table of Contents**

- A. Background
- B. Context
- C. Defense Expenditure and Arms Procurement in Sri Lanka
- D. Multilateral Donors, Military Expenditure and Conditionality
- E. Multilateral Donor Responses to Conflict in Sri Lanka
- F. Bilateral Donor Responses to Conflict in Sri Lanka
- G. Bilateral, Multilateral Donors and Conditionality: A Summary
- H. Donor Policies on Conflict: An Assessment
- I. Policy Options for DFID

The introductory section B of the report deals with the context of the conflict, covering some historical events, general reactions of the donor community and the development of general economic indicators, which are seen as an expression of the state of development in Sri Lanka.

Section C focuses on defense expenditure and arms procurement in Sri Lanka, drawing on the limited government resources and SIPRI figures as well as on the public debate in Sri Lanka.

Section D scrutinizes the nexus of the multilateral donors' approaches, military expenditure and conditionality. Therefore the current position and historical attitude of two International Financial Institutions (IFIs), namely the IMF and the World Bank, are discussed from the vantage point of the likelihood of shifting their policies in direction of working in and on conflict. Nonetheless, the author warns not to underestimate the bureaucratic obstacles in the two institutions.

Section E is focusing on multilateral responses to the conflict in Sri Lanka, taking as a starting point, that the majority of donor approaches have seen a significant transformation from "do no harm" to "do some good". Subsequently, the positions of the European Union, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank and the IMF are

discussed with regard to their willingness to address the conflict directly or condition the provision of funds.

Section F is about the responses of bilateral donors to the conflict in Sri Lanka. The current positions of Japan, Sweden, Canada, Norway and the Netherlands are discussed from the perspective what their main activity with regard to conflict transformation has been, and how likely their future engagement in a policy of increased conditionality is.

Section G summarizes the position of bilateral and multilateral donors on conditionality, stressing that all donors recognize fully the negative impact of war and defense spending upon development efforts in Sri Lanka. At the same time it is underscored, that all donors interviewed, were reluctant to become too much involved in this issue. Some sensitivity is there, but "(...) conservative forces in the headquarters appears to restrain the exploitation of opportunities or the development of more innovative approaches." (21)

Section H assesses the donor policies on conflict and concludes that there is very little appetite for the application of conditionality or performance criteria - at least from what is made semi-public. At the same time, there is a opportunity that the stand-by loan of the IFIs gives the Sri Lankan Government little room but to agree upon a gradual transformation in the security sector.

In Section I the author summarizes a number of policy options for DFID. Firstly, he calls for clarifying the linkages between military expenditure and conflict, as well as governance. Secondly, entry points for the donor community with regard to the secretive security sector should be uncovered, by undertaking policy relevant research. Thirdly, it calls for an intensified security sector reform because its members will otherwise always try to frustrate a peace settlement. Fourthly, it calls for keeping the pressure on IFIs to find ways of addressing military expenditure, as well as for donor coordination on the issues at stake.

### **Main Arguments / Methodology**

Focusing on the nexus of the ability of international donors to influence on economic policy and resource allocation decisions relating to conflict in Sri Lanka, this report aims at elaborating possible donor responses on the persistent conflict.

Methodologically, this report is based on interviews with mission representatives of bilateral and multilateral donors in Colombo.

### **Comment**

As it is primarily concerned with scrutinizing positions of large donors with regard to stepping up conditionality vis-à-vis the Government of Sri Lanka, there is an ambivalent outcome: On the one hand, an empirically and politically highly interesting picture of the potentials of international donors for engaging in conflict transformation is drawn. On the other hand, a necessary context sensitivity to the specific and complex causes and structures of the Sri Lankan conflict is largely absent. Furthermore, as a foreign policy analysis seeking for entrance points for interventions by the donors, it focuses too much on disincentives, e.g. economic conditionality, instead of highlighting necessary measures to build up personal trust between the international community and the local authorities. In comparison with Kuperus (2000) the author does not even try to analyze the ideological, and political factors underlying the multi-dimensional conflicts, while his analysis of multilateral donor policies in relation to opportunities for conflict transformation is much more instrumental but empirically more adequate.

**Bastian, S. (2001): Globalization, Foreign Aid and Conflict - The Case of Sri Lanka, in: Mayer / Rajasingham-Senanyake / Thangaraja (Eds.): forthcoming "Building Local Capacities for Peace: Rethinking Conflict and Development in Sri Lanka".**

#### **Table of Contents**

1. Politics of foreign aid - pre '77
2. Foreign aid in the context of globalization and conflict - post '77
3. Expanding objectives of foreign aid
4. Concluding remarks

The paper begins with a historical sketch on the politics of foreign aid in Sri Lanka before 1977. This shows how development ideologies of political parties in power and trends in foreign relations such as the Cold War influenced the flow of aid to Sri Lanka.

The second section focuses on the liberalized period of capitalism after 1977, when the flow of foreign aid and its influence reaches peak level. This period is characterized by a massive increase in aid flows in a context of globalization and conflicts, an increased influence of institutions of global governance in Sri Lankan affairs and a failure in the process of building a modern nation-state in Sri Lanka. On the issue of causes for the civil war, Bastian's explanation is, that there was a symbiosis of the liberalized phase of capitalism and civil war, e.g. arguing that the expanded flow of foreign resources helped the Sinhala ruling elite in the beginning of the 80ies to stabilize and pursue the war.

The third section describes expanding goals of foreign aid due to Western governments interest in conflicts and conflict resolution. Firstly, the author describes the mainstream of development assistance as now simultaneously promoting market economies and liberal democratic institutions and the post Cold War era as increasingly conflict ridden due to an ongoing expansion of capitalism. Secondly, he describes Butros Ghali's ' Agenda for Peace' as the starting point for the rise of the term 'complex humanitarian or complex political emergency' on the agenda of aid agencies, and regards this as for the first time that aid agencies became now political actors.

The increasing importance of INGOs and their widespread concept of community-development, as well as, the attempts to use it in order to transform local conflicts, is criticized of going together with the advent of neo-liberalism. Furthermore, the author describes that there is increased interest in an effective state in order to develop a successful market economy, in the reform of the security sector, and in government transparency and accountability from the side of multilateral donors.

Finally, his hypothesis is, that most donor discourses currently aim "for the total transformation of societies in developing countries including attitudes of individuals (20)."

The last section looks at the changing donors' policies in Sri Lanka, critically scrutinizing main ideas and concepts underlying the donor intervention. Firstly, Bastian criticizes donor interventions after 1977 of having been apolitical and not taking the deterioration of ethnic relations into account. The most negative example, being the donor led Mahaweli scheme and the author sees only one exception to this general blindness, as interventions to the plantation sector were to some extent successful. Secondly, Bastian criticizes various concepts of multilateral donors, such as the World Bank, promoting market relations and the commodification of natural resources, which will lead to new conflicts, then he warns for an open promotion of the institutions of liberal democracy as under the special conditions of Sri Lanka they might awaken inequalities and dormant societal conflicts. He criticizes that donors have a too positive understanding of civil society and instrumental understanding of NGOs as repository of progressive change and agents of conflict resolution, without taking real social forces in Sri Lanka into account. Thirdly, he criticizes the focus on community-level work as an expression of ignoring the underlying power relations behind the conflict and forgetting about the role of the ruling elite. Finally, he summarizes his argument that donors try to promote the models of advanced capitalist countries without any sense of the specificity of the history of Sri Lanka and sees the only positive aspects of donors interventions in promoting devolution and the settling of the conflict on the highest diplomatic level.

### **Main Argument and Methodology**

The main argument of the paper is that the present interest in conflict and conflict resolution is leading donors to get involved in a wide range of issues in developing countries. The objectives of development assistance have expanded from the traditional focus on economic development to cover governance, democracy, human

rights, development of civil society and conflict resolution. With the emergence of a single field of development and security, development assistance is - according to the author - now aiming at a total transformation of developing societies, which should neither be a feasible nor a legitimate objective for donor agencies. Bastian regards donor interventions without a deeper contextual knowledge as a dangerous game, especially to societies that bear the social costs of the conflicts. Methodologically, this paper is based on selected publications of international organizations and donor organizations as well as on a number of publications by Sri Lankan academics, using a critical historical approach to document analysis.

### Comment

This is a very interesting paper with regard to the debate amongst donors about joining a short-term decision-making oriented foreign policy perspective with a politically more conscious development cooperation perspective, focusing on a sustainable societal transformation to reduce causes of the multiple conflicts in Sri Lanka (see Kuperus 2000). Bastian criticizes a number of related development concepts, especially with regard to approaches of multilateral donors, fundamentally. Unfortunately, the position taken by Bastian with regard to a concept of a dialogue between internal and external political actors in trying to transform political and societal causes of the Sri Lankan conflicts, promoted by many European countries, is by no means clear.

Almost like the conservative 'realist' school of thought in international relations, he sketches a picture of Sri Lankan - foreign relations as favorably taking place only on the highest diplomatic level, while interventions on other levels are supposed to be illegitimate on the grounds of being too ideological. There is a similar ambivalence on the question of what political role development actors funded by foreign funds, can legitimately play. Admittedly, many donors were lacking a political understanding of their own activities, especially during the 80ies, but at the same time to fundamentally criticize the process of turning development cooperation into a more political conscious exercise, which is presently at stake, e.g. through raising conflict sensitivity of staff and looking for entrance points for conflict transformation on track 2 and track 3, does not seem to be a very consistent position on this issue. Nevertheless, this paper raises important questions with regard to the possibilities and limits of a successful integration of foreign policies and development measures to foster peacebuilding in Sri Lanka. In comparison with Kuperus (2000) and Smith (2001), Bastian's contribution to analyzing the nexus of development aid and changes in Sri Lankan politics is either empirically not equally detailed or falling short on the issue of possible steps to be taken to contribute to a long-term transformation of conflict causes.

Frerks / Van Leeuwen (2000): Conflict Policy Research Project (CPRP): The Netherlands and Sri Lanka - Dutch Policies and Interventions with regard to the Conflict in Sri Lanka, The Hague. Draft.

#### Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. An Outline of the Conflict in Sri Lanka
3. Interventions in the Conflict: Some International Aspects
4. Dutch Policies and Interventions
5. Major Findings and Lessons Learned

The starting point of the analysis is an outline of the history and political dynamics behind the Sri Lankan conflict (chapter 2). The notion of 'Complex Political Emergency' is applied to Sri Lanka, as conflict has a multi-causal nature and a variety of geographically dispersed conflicts in the country exists.

Chapter 3 sketches the nature of interventions by external actors, concluding that as a result, mainly the focus of development programs was changed. Subsequently, the diplomatic and political activities of the European and other western donors are scrutinized, concluding that the insistence on negotiations and considerations of conditionality have not resulted in a politically motivated cut back of ODA but in a change of the nature of development programs itself, e.g. Canada chose to channel ODA primarily through NGOs. Another channel discussed is the Lanka Development Forum, initiated by the World Bank, which comprises all important donors, but did not succeed to have a significant impact on Sri Lankan political leadership as the Sri Lankan government has become adept to "playing the donor game". In the next section the development of policies and practices of all major donor organizations active in relief, rehabilitation and development assistance is analyzed, concluding that everybody is investigating how to incorporate "conflict" into their development approaches. Regarding the role of NGOs as local capacities for peace a short but comprehensive summary on capacities and limits is given, highlighting the need for the donor community to accept the role of NGOs as political in its context and calling for a clarification of the politics of humanitarianism.

In chapter 4 an analyses of Dutch policies and instruments vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan conflict is undertaken, stressing that Dutch positions on the issue have for a long time accepted the viewpoints of the subsequent Sri Lankan governments with an unremitting confidence. Besides diplomatic initiatives, conflict prevention through development programming and project interventions financed by the Dutch government are analyzed. Given the dilemma either to support the maintenance of unity on the Island or to possibly undermine the legitimization of the government by e.g. criticizing human rights abuses, the reactions of the Dutch government were more reactive than proactive towards the conflict in the past.

Chapter 5 sums up the findings and lessons learned: Firstly, a bilateral and multilateral donor co-ordination is necessary. Secondly, international interventions either friendly, or in form of resolutions, conditionalities, or cuts in development aid have had no or only limited effects in the past. Thirdly, as the donor community lacks an explicit diagnosis and strategy for dealing with the conflict, development aid focusing on conflict prevention and peacebuilding through civil society initiatives has remained fairly insignificant up to the present day. Therefore, impact assessment methodologies to measure the impact of development programs on peace building and donors' capacities to analyze the conflict have to be developed.

## **Methodology**

The study on Sri Lanka is part of the larger 'Conflict Policy Research Project' of the Clingendael Institute, aiming at developing prognosis and policy instruments for interventions related to intrastate conflict based on comparative country case studies. Methodologically, the Sri Lanka case is based on relevant literature, files from the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the co-financing agencies as well as interviews with Dutch supported development projects in Sri Lanka and key informants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

## Comment

One outstanding feature of the Clingendael report is, that it analyses the diplomatic efforts and development interventions together in a comprehensive format and from a donor government's perspective. Compared to other reports, the background analysis is quite substantial and stresses the process of devolution, characteristics of warfare, and recent political developments in relation to the conflict. Aiming to develop a more coherent framework of foreign policies and development aid, the interesting question is highlighted as to how the long-term oriented perspective of development aid for societal development can be brought together with a foreign policy perspective, which has often been short-term and decision-making oriented in the past.

Furthermore, there are some arguments brought together (mainly drawing on Sunil Bastian's "The failure of State Formation, Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses"), why a too enthusiastic anticipation of the possible role of local NGOs for peacebuilding in Sri Lanka shouldn't be taken by aid donors. Even though a critical perspective towards civil society actors based on structural and historical arguments is to some extent justified in the case of Sri Lanka, a comprehensive and empirical grounded analysis of the interplay of the Sri Lankan state, civil society and foreign agencies has not been conducted in the preparation of this report which would certainly give better evidence.

## II.2 Policy Formulating and Implementing Perspective with regard to Rehabilitation and Peacebuilding

Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, S. L. G. (2001): Final Report on the National Framework for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka, Colombo.

### Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Policy guidelines
3. Priorities for Policy-Oriented Action
4. Programme Modalities
5. Institutional Mechanisms and Coordination
6. Reconciliation and Peacebuilding
7. Monitoring and Follow-up

Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction to the effects of the conflict on the socio-economic conditions in the country, describes main obstacles to a fruitful national relief, rehabilitation and reconciliation (RRR) process, summarizes the current status of the activities related to the RRR framework process, and describes the methodology of compiling the framework reports through policy working groups and stakeholder workshops.

In chapter 2 policy guidelines are formulated, drawing on the results of the working groups and workshop results and focusing on the following issues: Rights of the displaced and humanitarian law; maximizing rehabilitation and development; reconciliation and peacebuilding; program management and coordination; the movement of persons and goods. Chapter 3 tries to translate the guiding principles of chapter 2 into proposals for concrete action, differentiating between short-term as well as medium and long-term recommendations. Short-term recommendations are ranging from the recognition of the status and treatment of IDPs according to humanitarian law by both parties to the conflict to discontinuing the pass system in Vavuniya District or how to achieve language parity in education and administration. Medium and long-term recommendations cover measures like instilling a sense of

national identity or the need of preparatory work for the reintegration of former combatants.

Chapter 4 focuses on program modalities, basically, how relief, rehabilitation and reconciliation have been carried out by the state administration for the last years, giving recommendations to improve its goals and procedures. A wide range of issues is thereby covered, ranging from the need to update data on target groups and improve welfare center management, to the recommendation to create national mine action capacities.

Chapter 5 stresses aspects of institutional mechanisms and coordination to improve the effectiveness of RRR programs. One major finding is the recommendation that the routine work of monitoring and evaluating the RRR process should be vested with a single entity at the central level, namely the Human Disaster Management Council of the Presidential Secretariat. Subsequently, recommendations for establishing committees on different levels of the policy-making process in Sri Lanka are given: District Coordination Committees (DCCR); District Emergency and Preparedness and Response Committees; Divisional Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation Committees (DIVR); Village Rehabilitation Committees (VCR); an District Humanitarian Affairs Ombudsman (DHAO); a Provincial Coordinating Committee (PRCC); a National Coordinating Committee on Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation (NCCR); an Essential Service Coordinating Committee; a Programme Facilitation Committee at the Ministry of Defense.

Chapter 6 on reconciliation and peacebuilding describes possible actions to improve the process of rebuilding the bases for trust and collective activity in Sri Lanka. The main issues covered are how to put language parity into practice, and how to foster nation-building via civil society, responsible religious leadership and the media.

Chapter 7 reflects on the status quo of the process, the need to assure monitoring of the implementation, and recommends as the next step to appoint a high-level working group, incorporating a post-conflict perspective into the next version of the national RRR framework (preliminary outline of main determinants, e.g. resources needed for reconstruction) by conducting further studies on the meso and micro level. The altogether 7 annexes give further background information, e.g. a matrix of all recommendations as well as a list of the current composition of the working groups and of the national steering committee.

## Main Argument / Methodology

As a starting point of the report, shortcomings in the state-run administration of current RRR are described, practical and policy recommendations on four major issues are given (see chapter 2) and the need to improve the preparedness for the post-conflict period by integrating a detailed post-conflict perspective in the next version of the national RRR framework is stressed.

Methodologically, two streams of consultations and inquiries were mainly conducted: On the one hand consultations of national and international policy stakeholders in Colombo, which met in 4 different working groups. On the other hand, 52 consultative workshops in 10 districts of the Northeast and a number of sectoral or thematic workshops were conducted by the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies and the National Peace Council. Additionally, individual consultants compiled a number of reports and research notes on related issues.

### Comment

This is an outstanding report as it summarizes the first major attempt of external and internal stakeholders to jointly develop a policy framework covering large parts of the nexus of development and conflict transformation relevant in the Sri Lankan case. The multiple stakeholders and final authors very timely assume that there is a continuum of relief, rehabilitation and development measures in practice, and try to bridge the gap between the macro level of policy making in government institutions by means of a broad understanding of the politically relevant actors and by conducting a large number of workshops on the local level. Empirically, and in the light of the underlying broad idea for its initiation - how the government, civil society and the donor community could work together in promoting peace and reconstruction - it falls short on at least three aspects: Firstly, the workshops on the district level were only conducted in the Northeast, thereby excluding the conflict related problems in the South and in the plantation sector. Secondly, the recommendations on institutional mechanisms and coordination are in a somewhat mechanical way only proposing the establishment of new committees - instead of taking up the task of putting the shortcomings of the over complex set-up of state agencies and the practical role of non-Colombo-based NGOs and donor funded development projects, in formulating and implementing RRR policies into the picture.

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Thirdly, the whole issue of reconciliation and peacebuilding is reduced to the certainly important issue of language parity and a very general call for nation-building without thoroughly analyzing what nation-building, or maybe more appropriately, the development of an inclusive citizenship, under the conditions of the political culture and the political system in Sri Lanka could mean.

The final report on the national framework for relief, rehabilitation and reconciliation is giving a much more systematic overview on the process and the results of this large scale multi-stakeholder project, than Lankaneson (2001) and the Summarized Sectoral and District Reports (2000) can provide, as they are more specialized or empirically more detailed.

## Lankaneson (2000): Report on Institutional Framework for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation, Colombo.

### Table of Contents

1. Relief and Rehabilitation Policy of the Government
2. Multiplicity of Institutions
3. Findings
4. Recommendations for Institutional Framework on Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation
5. Planning, Implementing and Monitoring
6. Flow of Funds

Chapter 1 and 2 cover the terms of reference of the consultancy and remarks on methodology. Chapter 3 gives an introduction on the historical development of the manner how natural and human disaster have been managed in the state administration.

Chapter 4 shortly describes the relief and rehabilitation policy of the government under conditions created by the civil war. Chapter 5 firstly gives an overview about the multiplicity of institutions dealing with human disaster management and the resulting fragmentation of the institutional framework and raises the issue of parallel structures that came into being through donor interventions with regard to the rapid implementation of development projects. Secondly, all relevant government agencies are described, stating both historical functions and current mandate. The following are covered: The Commissioner General of Essential Services; Ministries for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction; Provincial Councils; District Reconstruction Coordinating Committee; Rehabilitation of Persons, Properties and Industries Authority; Resettlement and Rehabilitation Authority of the North; Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Fund; Ministry of Justice, Constitutional Affairs, Ethnic Affairs and National Integration; Presidential Task Force on Human Disaster Management; Department of Social Services; Director Rehabilitation of Armed Forces; Ministry of Public Administration.

Chapter 6 summarizes the findings, underscoring that there are more than ten institutions involved in human disaster management largely independent and with no single authority responsible.

Other findings were long delays and unnecessary procedures on the field level due to the confusion of responsibilities in the system, aggravated by military restrictions; over-centralization; most institutions promote the status quo rather than social change; provincial councils are not empowered to undertake relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction; private-sector participation in rehabilitation is not visible; generally there is a lack of human resources.

Chapter 7 is giving recommendations for an improved framework of state institutions for relief, rehabilitation and reconciliation.

Chapter 8 and 9 very briefly touch the issues of planning, implementing, and monitoring, as well as flow of funds.

### **Main Argument / Methodology**

The proposal aims to establish one single Ministry for relief, rehabilitation, and reconciliation (RRR) for the entire island. Methodologically, this report is based on government and non-governmental documents on rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation and on talks with government officials, representatives from international organizations and NGOs in Colombo as well as Ampara, Batticaloa, Trincomallee, and Vavuniya.

#### **Comment**

This report digs deep into the structure of government organizations for rehabilitation and reconstruction, what a UNDP evaluation mission in 1994 has labeled "complex and confused". Therefore, it is highly interesting for understanding many of the shortcomings that are visible today and for possible entry points for improving already existing procedures.

Unfortunately, the reports especially falls short on the latter issue, by coming up with a solely structural outline of an ideal-typical single RRR ministry, substituting all other agencies.

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Furthermore, it neglects the possible positive role of NGOs and Civil Society Organizations in RRR processes, as these are described as implementation aids for government agencies that mainly need to be controlled and coordinated. Despite these shortcomings, Lankaneson's report on the institutional framework for the RRR process is a good entry point with regard to one of the most important questions for policy implementation in Sri Lanka, namely, how to improve the coordination across different levels of policy formulation and implementation through organizational learning. In comparison to the Final Report on RRR (2001) Lankaneson's report has an already quiet specialized perspective, while in comparison with the Summarized Reports of the District and Sectoral Workshops (2000) this is an analytically necessary narrowing down of the research objective, which allows one to come closer to the causes of current policy formulation and implementation problems regarding conflict transformation in Sri Lanka.

**Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, S. L. G. (2000): The Framework for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation - Summarized Reports of the District and Sectoral Workshops, Colombo.**

**Table of Contents**

1. Framework on Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation District Workshop Reports - Bullet Points for Code of Conduct.
2. Executive Summary of Sectoral Reports on Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation. Code of Operation: Problems with current policies and operation modalities.
3. Framework on Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation District Workshop Reports - Bullet Points for Coordination and Institution Building.
4. Executive Summary of Sectoral Reports on Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation. Co-ordination and Institution Building.
5. Framework on Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation District Workshop Reports - Bullet Points for Programme Priorities.
6. Executive Summary of Sectoral Reports on Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation. Programmatic Priorities.
7. Framework on Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation District Workshop Reports - Bullet Points for Community Capacity for Reconciliation
8. Executive Summary of Sectoral Reports on Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation. Community Capacity for Reconciliation.

The first part starts with recommendations from the district workshop reports on relief, rehabilitation and reconciliation (RRR) that can be used as a basis for formulating a Code of Conduct for policy making.

The second part consists of a executive summary of the sectoral reports on RRR. Ten sectors (business sector, disabled soldiers, IDPs, media personnel, NGOs, professionals working with children, religious leaders, teachers, trade unions, women from the North East and South) were covered. Besides general problems encountered by most sectors with RRR processes (e.g. RRR not adopted to local needs, language issues, freedom of movement, censorship, emergency situation, burden of national security levy, insecurities of civilians), particular problems faced by disabled soldiers, internally

displaced people (IDPs), youth and children, women, and media personnel are summarized.

The third part consists of bullet points distilled from the long version of the district workshop reports on relief, rehabilitation and reconciliation on coordination and institution building.

The fourth part, once again, consists of an executive summary of the sectoral reports on RRR, but this time on the issue of co-ordination and institution building. The main needs, problems and solutions from the above ten sectors are summarized, firstly focusing on general problems encountered by most sectors (e.g. one proposal of the majority of the participants was not to provide relief and aid through the Ministry of Rehabilitation who does not distribute it equally but rather through NGOs or donor agencies), secondly summarizing problems faced by disabled soldiers, internally displaced people (IDPs), youth and children.

The fifth part, once again, consists of bullet points distilled from the long version of the district workshop reports on relief, rehabilitation and reconciliation but covering program priorities.

The sixth part summarizes the sectoral reports on RRR with regard to programmatic priorities. Programmatic priorities are given in relation to general priorities of all ten sectors and covers issues like stopping the war, representation and participation, strengthening security for civilians, programs for social integration and recognition of soldiers, refugee status for IDPs, and psychosocial support. The seventh part is an excerpt from the long version of the district workshop reports on RRR (bullet points) covering the issue of community capacities for reconciliation. The eighth and last part consists of an executive summary of the findings of all ten sectors, focusing on the main needs, problems and solutions that were mentioned in the workshops on the issue of community capacity for reconciliation. Issues mentioned were: negotiations with the LTTE, stopping organizations that advocate for war, appoint peace committees, the government must create the necessary environment for the people to go back, call for increase in opportunities for participation in the communities.

### **Main Argument / Methodology**

In the parts on the sectoral workshops the main needs, problems and solutions from ten sectors are summarized, firstly focusing on general problems encountered by most

sectors, while with regard to the district workshop reports main arguments of the participants were summarized in bullet points. All summaries are based on two larger reports from the RRR research component, namely the district workshop reports and the sectoral workshop reports, which describe specific needs and particular problems in a very comprehensive manner.

Methodologically, the findings are based on 52 consultative workshops in 10 districts of the Northeast with representatives of government institutions, local organizations, stakeholder associations, and international agencies, and a number of sectoral or thematic workshops, which were all conducted by the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies and the National Peace Council.

#### **Comment**

These summaries of the workshop results come in a rather unfamiliar format one has to get used to, but especially the sectoral research results are highly interesting for understanding needs, problems and possible solutions genuinely coming from the war effected areas. Thereby, they have been used and should be further used for identifying problems and achievements of the current RRR framework. Furthermore, it is a valuable empirical source for distilling new ideas and entry points for conflict transformation. Taking a broader understanding of conflict into account, one shortcoming is that only the directly war-affected areas were covered by these consultative workshops on the district and on sectoral levels.

As this report is serving the purpose of presenting empirical research results in a rather broad format, its strengths in comparison to the more comprehensive or analytically more focused approaches of the Final Report (2001) and the Report on the Institutional Framework (2000) is to give some voice to people involved with the RRR process in dispersed locations of the country.

**Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies / Wijesinha (2001): Workshop report on Concepts, Tools & Issues for Recovery and Reconstruction, Colombo.**

**Table of Contents**

1. Introduction
2. Scope
3. Workshop 1 - Expectations
4. Perspectives of the Challenges
5. Workshop 2 - Current National Initiatives
6. Workshop 3 - Key Reconstruction and Development Issues
7. Conclusions and Recommendations

This report is based on a workshop on the process of recovery and reconstruction from the impact of the on-going conflict in Sri Lanka, held in April 2001 by the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, funded by the British High Commission. Participants were donors, as well as implementers of programs of assistance, including NGOs and government agents. The results are presented according to three different workshop phases.

In the first workshop, the principal expectations to be considered in planning any follow up action after ending the violent conflict in the Northeast was clarified, ordering the results under the headings of information, organization, and vision. In the second workshop phase, current national initiatives were discussed, differentiating broad governmental policy decisions; the role of governmental agencies for implementation; and specific initiatives such as refugee resettlement. The third workshop was about key reconstruction and development issues such as creation of a national vision, and concrete initiatives, e.g. putting together a 'digest' to record ongoing activities in the field of relief or strengthening local administration through strengthening training and coordination.

The workshop report concludes with recommendations for prompt action (e.g. publishing digest on relief activities and lobbying with media), early implementation (e.g. training program in public policy for nominees from conflict affected districts),

and for ongoing discussion and consciousness raising (e.g. strengthening of local government institutions through the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs and National Integration).

### **Main Argument / Methodology**

The main goal was to identify challenges and to suggest guidelines for action of government agencies, donors, and NGOs in regard of preparing for post-conflict reconstruction. Methodologically, this report is based on direct workshop participation.

#### **Comment**

As a large number of voices from the international donor community, and a large number of representatives of various ministries and from Colombo-based NGOs participated, this report gives a very telling example of the problems involved, if one aims at preparing post-conflict policy-recommendations already today. Furthermore, it can serve as an insight into the dominant issues a substantial part of the policy formulating community in Colombo is involved with. Unfortunately, it comes in a hardly elaborated and often not very easy to read format.

## II.3 Development Cooperation Perspective for Societal Transformation of Violent Conflicts

Bigdon / Korf (2001): The role of Development Aid in Conflict Transformation - Facilitating Empowerment Processes and Community Building. Colombo.

### Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Track III: Conflict Transformation and the Role of Development Aid
3. The "Logic of (local) empowerment" and the Logic of Development Agencies
4. Empowerment in the Light of Different Discourses
5. Participation and Empowerment within Community Development
6. 'Spaces for Action' for the Facilitation of Empowerment Processes through Development Aid within Complex Emergencies
7. Conclusion: Empowerment Facilitators - Development Agencies as Political Actors in Complex Emergencies

This paper looks into the theoretical assumptions and expectations as well as into the practical experiences of empowerment-approaches within development aid with special regard to their potential for conflict transformation. Its starting point is the practice of traditional relief and development projects working in complex emergencies in the field of community development in Sri Lanka.

Chapter I introduces briefly the recent debate on the role of development aid in complex emergencies. Chapter II and III look into the recent developments of the conflict transformation discourse with special regard to the conclusions which can be drawn from the role of development aid working in conflict areas.

Chapter IV and V introduce common participatory and empowerment approaches within community development, looking into their theoretical objectives and their practical implementation. Chapter VI critically discusses possible spaces of action, as well as constraints, dilemmas and ambivalences for the facilitation of empowerment

processes through development aid within complex emergencies. In the last section, the authors conclude with an outlook on the potentials, constraints and ambivalence of empowerment approaches and demand a more political role of development aid in complex emergencies, promoting community building through empowerment and recognition towards a more inclusive citizenship.

### **Main Argument / Methodology**

The central research question is how the theoretical underpinnings of the conflict transformation discourse is fitting together with the role development projects aim to play within complex emergencies, with special regard to empowerment processes and community building. The main argument is, that the long-term process oriented "logic of local empowerment" inherent in the conflict transformation discourse is hardly fitting together with the rather output oriented logic of (conflict) management of development agencies. The authors promote the conflict transformation definition of identity conflicts and the empowerment and recognition approach. The conflict transformation definition of empowerment is based on the principal of recognition, which implies a process of dialogue and active listening to the opponent. Within the development oriented empowerment discourse, this aspect of recognition is often missing. On the practical side of project implementation, the paper argues that the project environment especially if it is in a conflict area, has to be seen as a complex system - where the macro conflict is interrelated with the village communities and where different interest groups are competing for resources. Focusing on empowerment processes in community building in complex emergencies development agencies have to act as political players consciously searching for spaces of action.

The paper illustrates potentials and constraints, success-stories, 'doing-harm-stories' and common dilemmas of donor interventions within complex emergencies. Regarding the dilemmas, the authors stress how important it is for donor agencies which are focusing on conflict transformation to consciously promote empowerment processes and the rebuilding of local democratic institutions, through a strategy of 'educated pragmatism'. Additionally they stress that empowerment approaches of donor interventions should incorporate much more aspects of recognition to support the development of an inclusive citizenship. Processes of recognition have to be facilitated beyond the borders of the village community. Facilitating dialogue forums and promoting co-operative networks on regional level could stimulate processes of empowerment and recognition, which, in turn, can lead to the transformation of some causes of the macro conflict.

## Comment

Bridging the theoretical discourse on conflict transformation and the role of development aid in complex emergencies, this paper is highly innovative. Subsequently, common theoretical visions are synchronized with the practical experiences of empowerment and community building approaches in development oriented emergency aid in Sri Lanka. The paper summarizes its practical findings within a table distinguishing between potentials, constraints and ambivalences of participatory and empowerment approaches with regard to local conflict transformation. On the one hand, this table is a helpful instrument for development practitioners. On the other hand, it cannot account for the dilemmas and political spaces, which actors on a local level are confronted with and some of which have been carefully elaborated in course of the narrative part of this important report.

In comparison with Bush (2001a) this paper elaborates the general tensions between the conflict transformation definition of empowerment approaches and the somewhat reductionist empowerment discourses of development agencies, analytically and empirically in much more detail. From this theoretical background and a long-term project experience, instruments used on the local level of conflict prone areas are productively criticized, pointing at entry points for further improvement. This in-depth perspective is not provided by Bush (2001a) as he has merely conducted a 'PCIA-Scan' and more focused on donor programming. In comparison with Foell, J. / Harrison, E. / Stirrat, R. (2000), this paper uses a conceptionally more sophisticated approach as it integrates the micro and meso perspective of development projects with regard to conflict transformation and sees an increase of target group participation as a politically conscious step to improve the work of development projects.

**Bush (2001a): Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Swedish Development Cooperation with Sri Lanka, Colombo.**

**Table of Contents**

- I. Introduction to Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)
- II. Setting the Context: ODA and Militarized Violence in Sri
- III. Peace and Conflict Impact Scan of Selected Sida-supported Activities
  - a. Project: Electrification Project
  - b. Agricultural and Fisheries Input for Resettled Farmers and Fishermen
  - c. Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP) - Plantation Sector
  - d. Project: Research Cooperation
  - e. Project: Education for Peace
- IV. Peace and Conflict Impact Considerations for Swedish ODA to Sri Lanka
- V. Conclusions and Recommendations

In the first and second chapter, Bush introduces the concept of peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) and tries to crystallize critical issues for Sweden and other donors on the nexus of development aid and militarized violence in Sri Lanka. One interesting hypothesis in his conflict analyses is that the Tamil-Sinhalese divide of today is often projected on the reading of past conflict events and thereby obscures the examination of the patterns of conflict and the sources of group identity. Therefore, pockets and processes of inter-group co-operation and peaceful coexistence, which existed often in the middle of intense social conflict, are frequently left out.

In the third chapter, five Swedish development projects are scrutinized with regard to potential peace or conflict impact issues and opportunities how to proceed in the future. A rural electrification project (together with the Ceylon Board of Electricity), a rural development project providing agricultural and fisheries inputs for resettled farmers and fishermen in the North, an integrated rural development project in the tea plantation sector, a research cooperation project and a project on education for peace and democracy are covered.

In the fourth chapter Bush discusses 10 issues of Swedish ODA to Sri Lanka, ranging from questions of economic development and poverty alleviation to the necessity to avoid the ghettoization of peace work.

In the fifth chapter the author presents conclusions and recommendations for SIDA's work in Sri Lanka. Additionally, the study comprises 7 appendices, ranging from the current Swedish country strategy, an excerpt of an older case study on two projects (Madura Oya and the Gal Oya project) and short articles on corruption and mismanagement in relation to the Ceylon Electricity Board.

### **Main Argument / Methodology**

With regard to the overall country strategy and the set up of SIDA work in Sri Lanka, the author criticizes that almost all kinds of development mechanisms are to a large degree directed from SIDA headquarter in Stockholm. Problematic issues in this context are the large distance between Stockholm and Colombo, the decreasing political significance attributed to Sri Lanka, and the compartmentalization of peace in conflict issues within the SIDA headquarter.

Finally, Bush stresses that an explicit focus on peace and conflict issues as it is already outlined in the current country strategy does not necessarily mean that Sweden is already working on the conflict. At the same time, it should not be assumed that traditional development approaches do automatically have the tendency of contributing to the conflict. Both need to be monitored continuously, especially as the political profile and risk levels of the projects increase and might be perceived as "politicized peacebuilding projects" from the parties to the conflict.

Methodologically, he stresses that the report is not an assessment of the on-the-ground impact of Swedish development projects resulted from the PCIA, but rather it should be seen as an analytical and planning tool, which brings up important questions, outlines possible modifications, and guides the monitoring of a project. Furthermore, he stresses that the larger context, namely the fact that the Sida Development Program in Sri Lanka has a comparatively small size with regard to other donors, has to be taken into account.

## Comment

Bush claims that his report is not a comprehensive evaluation of the Swedish Development Program, but rather a scan of peace and conflict impact of selected Swedish development initiatives and the current country strategy. PCIA is seen as an instrument for the project level, which has to be understood as an interpretive exercise and has to take a "thick" perspective on the particular project context. Therefore, one line of argument is that the report itself illustrates how PCIA might be applied and what it might reveal when it is applied. This "thick" understanding of project contexts is necessary but in the course of developing his 5 cases in this report, Bush does only exceptionally fulfill the thereby created expectations: In comparison to other case studies, the project contexts and the possible peacebuilding impacts on a micro and meso level are roughly sketched. A real strength of this study is that it integrates a "PCIA-Scan" on a wide range of projects from one donor country with an empirically and conceptually thorough analysis of the macro conflict and finally puts this into relation with the overall country strategy and internal organizational procedures of that donor.

The central advantage of Bush's paper in comparison with Foell, J. / Harrison, E. / Stirrat, R. (2000) is its explicit focus on conflict impacts and the detailed discussion of possible entrance points for a reformulation of the country programming of one bilateral donor.

**Foell / Harrison / Stirrat (2000): Participation, Patrons and the Village  
- The Case of Coastal Zone Management in the Puttalam District, Sri  
Lanka, Brighton.**

**Table of Contents**

- I. Part One: Context and Themes
- II. Part Two: Fieldwork Findings
- III. Part Three: Discussion - Participatory Mechanisms for Coastal Management?  
Interests, Stakeholders, Institutions and Power in the Community
- IV. Part Four: Policy Implications

Part 1 is a theoretical and historical introduction to stakeholder and community participation in Coastal Zone Management (CZM) in general and for the case of the Puttalam district, Sri Lanka especially.

Part 2 describes findings from the fieldwork ordered by issues, such as institutions, shrimp aquaculture, fishing, vegetable production, tourism, mangrove and poverty. Conceptually, the authors differentiate between formal and informal institutions, putting party politics, the market, regional governmental and non-governmental organizations, and village organizations, e.g. founded by the Catholic Church, under the former. Under the heading of informal institutions come informal village institutions - basically households, based on nuclear families - and a patronage system understood here in a very broad sense, meaning politicians doing favors for people in exchange for political support. As patronage is used as a metaphor describing the other side of the formal institutional framework, the organization of personal and/or collective connections is described in a complex system from the village to the national political level. Therefore, very different roles of clients and patrons are being described, e.g. patrons even take on roles of the police, but the political economy of shrimp farming being the best example for patronage of all sectors described. Regarding fishing for example, the complex political patterns underlying the frequently occurring fish disputes are unfolded, displaying the role of actors and markets on the local, regional and national level.

Part 3 is a discussion on the nexus of interests, stakeholders, institutions and power in the villages. Hereby, the formation and dynamics of the formation of interests,

stakeholders and power shifts in the community as well as the prominent role of patronage are described and put into a stark contrast with usual conceptualizations of participatory or stakeholder approaches in CZM and development aid. Villages are described as arenas for social interaction with hardly any stable formation of interests groups inside and influenced by markets and party politics. Identity categories like "the villagers", assumingly often used by standard CZM approaches, are criticized as they do not take categories like origin, religion, caste, occupation, class, gender or household-belonging into account and ignore that identities are often used strategically.

Patronage is placed in the context of wider market relations, seen as a political mechanism to protect short-term commercial interests and therefore counter acting long-term development goals supported by CZM. On this background the authors hypothesize that participatory development interventions in the context of patronage might paradoxically even contribute to the marginal role of development aid under patronage conditions.

Part 4 analyses the policy implications of the findings in relation to the conceptualization of stakeholder analysis and participatory instruments on the village level, e.g.: Stakeholder analyses needs to be extremely flexible in order to account for social complexity, including formal/informal institutions, macro, meso, and micro level structures; patrons are primary stakeholders that needs to be addressed; development interventions have to adopt an process approach and acknowledge that their own actions are political. Furthermore, practical implications for CZM in Puttalam district are drawn.

### **Main Argument / Methodology**

The study starts with a description of the problems which arise, when development organizations try to move to a more political understanding of their work on the project level, using the instrument of stakeholder participation. Problematic here is the assumption that the "local" is clearly bounded and is a defined entity such as the village, within which there are clearly defined interests groups whose needs can be ranked and compared. This too formalized approach is aggravated by the agencies need to strike a balance between empirical complexity and manageable categories. Therefore, this study tries to describe the social complexities of the Puttalam District in Sri Lanka, subsequently challenging simple assumptions of participation. Methodologically, the study is based on detailed qualitative work in the villages of Ambakandawila, Mampuri, and Modarawella between March 1998 and June 1999.

## Comment

From the perspective of making development interventions on the project level more sensitive for the complexity and social dynamics of village policy formation, subsequently taking important political, cultural and social factors on meso and macro levels into account, this is a path breaking work. It is not just rhetorically stressing the importance of 'the contextual' but reflecting the political difficulties insiders and external actors have to face if they try to identify long-term common interests among the people in the villages and to design appropriate project interventions, giving plenty examples. The idea of analyzing social and micro-political patterns, e.g. households or patronage systems, as 'the other' to the formal institutions, is highly insightful. Yet, the concept of patronage lacks coherence and its relation to the few interests groups, which according to the authors are existing and politically active and thereby bridging the formal and the informal political arena on the village level, has to be clarified much more. Unfortunately, the report is based on a over-critical attitude towards participatory and stakeholder approaches in development aid, neither taking the diversity of its applications by different donors into account, nor reflecting the difficulties that would arise if donors would give the idea of a thorough analyses of interests groups up for an strategic co-optation of powerful patrons, e.g. by monetary means.

One strengths of this paper in comparison to Bigdon/Korf (2001) and Bush (2001) is the sometimes very creatively applied political economy perspective to community dynamics, while the central question of how to support conflict transformation is unfortunately not at the center.

Goodhand (2000): *Aid, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka*. London.

#### Table of Contents

- I. Mapping the Conflict and Responses to it
- II. Mapping Aid in Sri Lanka
- III. Donors, Aid and the Dynamics of Peace and Conflict
- IV. Towards Improved Policy and Practice
- V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Starting with a brief overview of the history of conflict in Sri Lanka, the main aid actors and the type of assistance provided are outlined. In a following section, the relationship of different donor approaches and the dynamics of violent conflict is examined. A fourth section scrutinizes, how development programs could be made more conflict sensitive.

Finally, recommendations for aid donors are given, stressing the need for system wide approaches, the need for integrating more sensitivity for conflict dynamics taking reconciliation processes into account, as well as emphasizing capacity development of the staff through network building and long-term commitment.

#### Main Argument / Methodology

Goodhand argues, that the provision of aid has impacts on the community-based reconciliation on the micro-level and at the same time on the incentive system of national political actors, thereby having an amplifying or moderating effect on the crisis of the state, which is at the core of the Sri Lankan conflict. His recommendations for donor agencies aim to make development programs in Sri Lanka generally more conflict sensitive and strengthen the positive benefits of aid with an explicit conflict reduction focus. The study is based on interviews with donors, government officials, NGOs and academics in Colombo, field trips to the south and east as well as drawing on current literature.

## Comment

Goodhand has provided the yet most comprehensive account of the interplay of the conflict dynamics in Sri Lanka and the donor approaches to the conflict. With regard to donor policies he recommends a system wide approach, stresses the need for aid coordination and the extension of conflict sensitivity on all levels of interventions. From the rather state-centered perspective on the political system and the conflict taken, it is not surprising that local capacities for peace in the civil society are not covered extensively as well as that the empirical and conceptional foundation of the analysis of the political system on the meso and local level is yet not sufficiently detailed.

**Bush (1999): The Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations. Paris.**

**Table of Contents**

1. Executive Summary
2. Principal Findings
3. Introduction
4. Sri Lanka Case Study
5. Broad issues and Themes on donors and Peacebuilding Incentives / Disincentives

Beginning with a synopsis of the violent conflict in Sri Lanka, a chronology of donor responses to the conflict on the program level, on the level of instruments and on the project level, is outlined. Furthermore, the patterns of donor coordination are analyzed and the question discussed, under which circumstances donor conditionality can be successful. Finally, Bush addresses 7 broad issues on donors and their role in the peacebuilding process.

The central research question is, how development cooperation program may prevent, mitigate, or indeed, exacerbate, conflict. The central conceptual point of reference is a broad understanding of "development incentives and disincentives" in Sri Lanka. Bush aims to change the way humanitarian aid is provided and thereby consciously reinforce peacebuilding incentives through development programming. Results are: Efforts by development agencies must address both intra- and inter-group conflict and comprise the whole island. Conditionality was most effective at the micro-project level. To facilitate and support peacebuilding initiatives within Sri Lanka, it is necessary to identify and map local capacities for peace. The nexus of ODA and societal peacebuilding need to be "(...) internally driven and "indigenously controlled approaches that draw on and cultivate those indigenous resources necessary for war-torn societies to build their own peace (..)". It cannot substitute for track one or track two diplomacy.

## Main Argument / Methodology

There is a need for developing programming tools to measure the specific impact of ODA on the dynamics of peace and conflict. The mismatch between "results-based management under northern control" development approaches and the necessary "process-oriented, community- controlled peacebuilding and development" approaches have to be taken seriously. Especially a "results-based management" approach of bilaterals is antithetical to the necessary responsiveness under uncertain working conditions of conflict areas. More donor coordination is necessary to increase the potential for influencing (dis)incentives for peace. Methodologically, this study is based on qualitative interviews in 1999 and an extensive literature study.

### Comment

Bush gives a very comprehensive account of the donor responses to the conflict and relates them to the political processes that mitigate or exacerbate conflict. His intriguing idea of reshaping humanitarian or development aid programming to consciously reinforcing peacebuilding incentives in Sri Lanka, still needs a lot of reform efforts and increase of political consciousness on the side of the donor agencies. Nevertheless, he has pointed out the probably most important dilemmas of the donors policies and practices that have to be resolved.

**Goodhand / Lewer (1999): NGOs and Peace Building in Complex Political Emergencies: a Case Study of Sri Lanka, in: Third World Quarterly 20, 1: 69-87.**

Goodhand and Lewer focus on the impacts of violent conflict and NGO interventions in village communities situated in the 'gray areas' of disputed territory in eastern Sri Lanka. Defining "(...) activities which contribute to institutional and infrastructure work related to long-term reconciliation and social integration activities" as best practice for peacebuilding, they focus on how conflict entrepreneurs (e.g. SLF, LTTE) or 'peace entrepreneurs' (e.g. community-based NGOs) influence 'social capital' in the villages.

### **Main Argument / Methodology**

Their central argument is that NGOs have only a limited impact on the local dynamics of the violent conflict, and to have any peace-building role, NGOs must undertake a more fine-grained analysis of the community social fabric and the economic and political processes involved. Based on an in-depth survey on the community level, and two other surveys on the NGO level and on the macro-level of the conflict in Sri Lanka, the study uses a bottom-up research framework. It aims at generating policy recommendations on the macro level for peacebuilding interventions by NGOs and other humanitarian agencies.

### **Comment**

While the picture drawn by the authors sets aside the political dynamics inside the communities and does not sufficiently focus on the inter-community dynamics, it nevertheless gives a good account on the opportunities and boundaries of NGOs activities on the community level of conflict-affected areas. The authors convincingly argue for a better understanding of the complexity of historical and social detail, and for NGOs who want to get more actively involved in peacebuilding, they recommend the development of more sophisticated tools and capacities.

**Van Brabant (1997): The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: the case of Sri Lanka, Relief and Rehabilitation Network (RRN), London.**

**Table of Contents**

- I. The Coordination of Humanitarian Action
- II. Humanitarian Action in Sri-Lanka
- III. Mechanisms for Coordination
- IV. Structural and Contextual Constraints on Coordination

In chapter 1 the term "coordination" is defined and different actors who play a role in coordination of humanitarian action are introduced, like international NGOs, the United Nations (UN) and last but not least the government of the respective country.

Chapter 2 describes the humanitarian action on the ground, within the different stages of the conflict in Sri Lanka and considering the strong role of the Sri Lankan government (GoSL) within the conflict.

In chapter 3 the existing mechanisms for coordination of humanitarian action are described, focusing on the coordination mechanism of the Sri Lankan government, through the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, the UN-coordination, through an "NGO-Donor Forum" and the "Humanitarian Adviser" as well as the coordination mechanisms through the NGO Consortium for Humanitarian Agencies and the Interagency Emergency Group. Chapter 4 summarizes the structural and contextual constraints on coordination, like the resistance of many agencies against coordination mechanisms and the role of political actors, like the Ministry of Defence (MoD), who undermine meaningful coordination through their actions.

Brabants main question is the scope of humanitarian space for which donor agencies have to bargain and which requires coordination amongst the different bilateral donor agencies and international organizations as well as improved communication and interaction between the humanitarian agencies and the GoSL. In addition to some general obstacles to effective coordination, the specific interest lies in examining the difficulties of coordinating humanitarian efforts within the context of a strong government at war.

With regard to the coordination between humanitarian agencies and the GoSL Brabant stresses the following factors: Unlike in other countries the Sri Lankan government continued to maintain a civic administration in the North-East, even in the LTTE controlled areas, claiming responsibility for all its citizens. The GoSL defines the conflict as an internal affair, claiming to maintain the lead in managing the crisis. This specific role of the Sri Lankan government in the conflict provides the scope of action for international humanitarian action and has often lead to clashes between the Sri Lankan government and international organizations, especially with the UN. Often donor agencies face control and restriction of humanitarian space. Many attempts undertaken so far to improve the donor-GoSL communication and interaction have failed - the responsible agencies or appointed "Focal Point Civil Servants" often lack appropriate authority and a clear mandate to fulfill their tasks effectively. A major problem for effective coordination is the fact that military and political objectives were allowed to override humanitarian concerns and the MoD did not join the interagencies coordination meetings.

With regard to the coordination amongst humanitarian agencies Brabant reviews the NGO-Consortium on Relief and Rehabilitation and the Interagency Emergency Group, which functioned simultaneously for organizational but also political reasons. Throughout the period of different conflict stages, humanitarian agencies not only needed to coordinate for program effectiveness, but also to advocate for humanitarian space and access. The review revealed that the NGO consortium has improved its activities, also there is still a discrepancy between the stated objectives and the minimalist practice of coordination that the members allowed. The consortium failed to stimulate critical debate around policy and program issues. On the other hand the Interagency Group did provide a forum for collective reflection on the ways on which humanitarian efforts could be co-opted by parties to the conflict, which prevented a situation in which agencies could be played off against each other.

### **Main Argument / Methodology**

Van Brabant discusses the question of coordination of humanitarian action in the case of Sri Lanka. An important statement of Brabant is, that the coordination amongst humanitarian agencies is often weak due to the agencies' claim to have different mandated, different operational principles and because agencies want to maintain their independence and individual profile.

Methodologically, it is based on reports of the organizations involved, as well as on personal experience and on talks with the staff.

### **Comment**

The paper explores a number of constraints to effective coordination, including the absence of professional and methodological knowledge, the usual institutional resistance to coordination, and contextual constraints such as the outbreak of war. The absence of an effective institutional link between the humanitarian efforts of the government and those of specialized agencies revealed the most important obstacle for effective coordination.

Furthermore, the paper gives a good overview on important actors for coordination of humanitarian action and the existing forums and mechanism of coordination in Sri Lanka. The reviewed constraints and backlashes demonstrate very well the difficulties of effective coordination on the one hand but also points at the potentials of different forums which in their combined efforts can step by step improve the communication, interaction and cooperation for humanitarian action.

Stewart / Meghan (1998): Democracy, Conflict and Development - Three Cases, Oxford.

#### Table of Contents

- I. Introduction
- II. The Cases of Kenya and Uganda
- III. Does the structure of democratic institutions influence democracy's ability to contain conflict? (Comparison with Sri Lanka)
- IV. Conclusions

The authors are scrutinizing the nexus of institutional democracy, development and conflict in Uganda, Kenya and Sri Lanka. In the case of the latter, they argue that the central goal of the institutional engineering approach to democracy under the conditions of multi-ethnic rivalry, namely the formation of a multi-ethnic coalition of commitment on the level of the political elite, was to some extent attained. Nevertheless, by the restructuring of the political system (1989-1994), there have been no new incentives for ethnic accommodation generated and the current institutional system still encourages the marginalisation of the Tamils. The rise and role of the Muslim parties, e.g. might even further exacerbate the conflict between Muslims and Tamils on a regional level.

#### Main Argument / Methodology

The authors' central argument is, that in the case of Sri Lanka even the most successfully engineered democratic structures are not capable in themselves to eliminate conflict and in some cases even encourage it. One reason for that is the form of democratic institutions in Sri Lanka, another is the uneven socio-economic development of the society. Therefore, well-designed democratic institutions may be a necessary but not sufficient pre-condition for a peace-oriented development process. Instead, they argue for a government of unity which incorporates all major groups for a transitional period, especially immediately after conflict and before developing a multiparty system.

Methodologically, this is a major theoretical work, drawing extensively on secondary literature.

### Comment

Even though, the authors focus on the somewhat outdated debate on whether a multiparty system or a consociational regime is more appropriate for development countries with a highly divided society, some findings of their investigation, namely the importance of a strong civil society, a independent and functioning judiciary as well as an appropriate system of economic redistribution do matter in the case of Sri Lanka.

Their conclusion, that an inclusive, developmentally-oriented regime would - for a certain time after the end of the conflict - be a more appropriate way of organizing for highly divided societies, is neither applicable to a Sri Lankan reality nor to any other conflict which can be called a complex and ongoing political emergency.

**Goodhand / Atkinson (1999): Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding - A Synthesis of Findings from Afghanistan, Liberia and Sri Lanka, London.**

**Table of Contents**

- I. Introduction
- II. Current Debates on Humanitarianism, Conflict and Peacebuilding
- III. Case Studies
  - a. Afghanistan
  - b. Liberia
  - c. Sri Lanka
- IV. Findings
- V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Chapter 1 describes two broad "school of thought", which emerged in reaction to the question how to provide humanitarian assistance (HA) in complex political emergencies: Humanitarian maximalists, believing that a broadening of HA to include developmental and peacebuilding objectives is necessary and that it should be linked e.g. to diplomacy; humanitarian minimalists, believing that the primary goal of saving lives can only be achieved through the principles of impartiality and neutrality.

Chapter 2 describes case studies on Liberia, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan. Firstly - as for all cases - the socio-economic and historical background to the conflict in Sri Lanka is unfolded. Secondly, the structure of aid to Sri Lanka is analyzed and a brief history of donor responses to the conflict is given. One point is that large-scale development assistance, rather than HA has had an exacerbating impact on conflict dynamics in Sri Lanka. Another point is that the "big three" World Bank, Japan and ADB, have learn to take the issue of conflict sensitivity seriously and mainstream it into their programs.

Chapter 3 is giving some results on how to better analyze conflict situations and the role of humanitarian aid within, and on the nexus of aid, conflict, and peacebuilding. Generally, they differentiate between three donor approaches to conflict - working around, working in, working on conflict - and empirically come the conclusion that a mix in organizations prevails. Concerning the quality of aid in Sri Lanka it is remarked that the strong state involvement in the aid system, and the dynamic civil society in Sri Lanka have had a quiet positive impact. Furthermore, they criticize the division of budget lines between humanitarian aid and development assistance as well a the often weak involvement of donors with civil society.

Chapter 4 is summarizing major recommendations for humanitarian aid donors, focusing on how to support an enabling environment for conflict prevention and peacebuilding as well as how to increase the conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding potential.

**Main Argument / Methodology**

The report summarizes current debates on humanitarian assistance (HA), conflict and peacebuilding and asks how HA can support conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It aims to place current analysis into the broader political and institutional context of the aid agencies. The main argument is that donors have to analyze local conditions in complex political emergencies much more and adopt to them, while recognizing the possibly negative links of their programming and conflict dynamics. Therefore, donors have to realize that aid is only one of a number of policy instruments possibly helpful in conflict situations and that a network of downstream and upstream actors in the aid system have to be taken into account if their policy and practice is to be significantly improved. In Goodhand / Atkinson's words: "Understanding the political economy of a conflict should therefore be complemented with an understanding of the political economy of aid." Methodologically, it is based on interviews and background material from 3 case studies on Liberia, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan, synthesizing the results by means of a country comparison.

**Comment**

Goodhand / Atkinson report is a significant contribution as it summarizes basic categories and differences in the debates on HA in conflict situation and gives a good empirical overview due to its comparative method. With regard to the Sri Lankan case, their characterization of the role of the state as well as the NGO community is too positive and empirically not detailed enough. One conclusion, namely to assume that development aid was not used in a confrontational way and therefore has played a positive role for the development of the country as well as for overcoming the conflict seems questionable, given the historical dynamics and various voices confronting donor behavior on the grounds of having been too passive for too long. But the authors rightly warn for the tendency amongst donors, trying to implement 'structural stability' following a standardized model, and having too many hopes for confrontational conditionalities to bring about an easy solution to multi-dimensional conflicts.

## Klingebiel (1999): Impact of Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations - Cross-section Report on Evaluations of German Development Cooperation in Six Countries, Berlin.

### Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations derived from the Evaluations
3. General Conditions for Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations
4. Conflict Recognition and the Flow of Information
5. Relationship between German Development Cooperation and Conflict Situations
6. Impact of German Development Cooperation on Actual and Potential Conflict Situations
7. Special features of Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations
- General Conclusions and Recommendations

Chapter 1 gives an general overview on the conditions for development cooperation in conflict situations. Chapter 2 deals with conflict recognition and the flow of information over all levels of German development cooperation and across the different institutions involved.

Chapter 3 describes the relationship between German development cooperation and conflict situations from the perspective of central procedures and principles normally involved in German development measures. In most countries studied (Ethiopia, El Salvador, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda, Sri Lanka), German development co-operation has taken a "mixed conflict strategy" with both elements of reactive conflict related adjustments and an explicit sensitivity to the conflict. Klingebiel concludes that the direct influence of German development cooperation and the whole international donor community on conflict situations is very limited. Development cooperation actors are often insufficiently aware of conflict situations and there are no "real conflict" strategies, e.g. for Sri Lanka. The role of the policy dialogue between the German government's agencies and the host country is mentioned as being too much used to criticize the partner government verbally, instead of imposing an explicit conditionality.

Chapter 4 describes possible positive and negative impacts of German development cooperation on a macro and on the micro level. On the macro level, Klingebiel

identifies 5 possible positive impacts, which range from the eventual removal of causes of the conflict to the achievement of security and improvement of the human rights situation. Furthermore, he identifies 8 possible negative impacts on the macro level, which range from the possibility to stabilize the government, to the possibility of development aid supported economic reforms increase the competitive behavior in the public sector, thereby strengthening conflict dynamics. On the micro level, Klingebiel differentiates between explicitly conflict-related measures and non-conflict related measures. In the case of Sri Lanka, explicitly conflict-related measures like the rehabilitation and stabilization packages, which have helped to normalize the situation in various regions and a decline in law-breaking and arbitrary acts is associated with them. For non-conflict related measures there was some positive impact found, e.g. through "classical" water supply projects, as some improved participation, and contributed to the removal of clientelist structures. Furthermore, four unintended negative impacts were identified.

Chapter 5 describes some special features which development cooperation has to face in conflict situations.

In Chapter 6 Klingebiel draws general conclusions and recommendations regarding the role of German development co-operation in conflict areas. Especially policy dialogue, financial cooperation, and technical cooperation have positive and negative impacts. Development cooperation should be used for strategic purposes in conflict situations, therefore a better assessment of political consequences has to be obtained. Where the government pursues a repressive policy that exacerbates conflict, serious thought should be given to terminating development cooperation.

Finally, he calls for conflict impact assessment on the level of development programs and projects and more coordination. The donor coordination and an internal coordination of German foreign policies and German development cooperation in one country - regarding the question, whether they run counter against each other - under the lead of foreign policies is necessary. The following overall recommendations for German development cooperation are given: 1. The procedures and instruments have to be reviewed on sufficient flexibility. 2. Opportunities for cooperation with non-governmental counterparts in civil society have to be clarified. 3. Measures like "open funds" are especially suitable for countries in a conflict situation. 4. General principals, e.g. sustainability and ownership, need to be adjusted when conflict occurs. 6. German development cooperation is an opportunity for foreign policy to play a more active role. 7. German development cooperation can never be purely neutral; but should

appear impartial. Finally, Klingebiel calls for staff training on "development cooperation in conflict situations" in all German development institutions.

### **Main Argument / Methodology**

Especially policy dialogue, financial cooperation, and technical cooperation have positive and negative impacts. Development cooperation should be used for strategic purposes in conflict situations, therefore a better assessment of political consequences has to be obtained. Where the government pursues a repressive policy that exacerbates conflict, serious thought should be given to terminating development cooperation. Methodologically, the comparative study is based on files at the BMZ, GTZ and KfW, interviews within Germany with the Federal Foreign Office and personnel from all development cooperation institutions. Furthermore, interviews in Sri Lanka were conducted with the embassy, the GTZ and with representatives from the conflicting parties.

#### **Comment**

On the one hand, Klingebiel gives a very detailed account of the up to the present day largely neglected role of "conflict" in German development cooperation. His pragmatic view that non-violent conflicts are generally seen as a necessary component of society seems very plausible. Unfortunately, his institutional point of view forces readers inexperienced with the German development system to adopt to a sometimes peculiar vocabulary. On the other hand, his emphasize on the strategic aspects in donor-government negotiations is not backed up by a detailed conflict analyses. It seems not a sufficiently detailed analyses to stress that in all six countries covered - including Sri Lanka - either rivalry for resources and/or the dominance of certain social groups were the main causes for conflict.

## II.4 Humanitarian Aid for Reconciliation Perspective

OXFAM / Lewer (1998): Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention, Bradford.

### Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Section I - Contextual Factors
3. Section II - Field Trips : Peacebuilding Openings and Implications
4. Section III - Recommendations

The first section introduces some of the contextual factors which may help OXFAM staff when they are thinking about the implications of incorporating peacebuilding into their strategic planning. It is introducing general principals, approaches and instruments of peacebuilding and conflict prevention relevant for development projects, e.g. stressing that peacebuilding means an explicit commitment to the improvement of relationships and social conditions for example by advocacy work. It shortly introduces approaches such as civil society, social capital, social energy, social fabric, conflict analysis, entry points for peacebuilding such as leadership and relationships.

The second section briefly describes the field visits made to selected OXFAM programs in the South of Sri Lanka, in which potential openings for peacebuilding initiatives, and the implications for OXFAM were identified.

The third section is making recommendations to help OXFAM staff designing programs. Lewer is giving 15 recommendations covering issues such as assessing the own capacities to carry out peace building efforts on a community level and the necessity to be transparent on a meso or macro-political level as to prevent from appearing as a threat to political power structures.

### Main Argument / Methodology

The main goal of this study is to find out, to what extent peacebuilding and conflict prevention could become a centralized component of Oxfam's program strategy in Sri

Lanka, and how this could be implemented. The main argument is that OXFAM has to decide whether to take a 'bolted-on' or stand alone approach to targeting peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, has to develop own peace indicators, has to give transparency a very high priority, needs to select pilot projects on the basis of staff commitment as well as local conditions, and needs to network with similar research programs and initiatives such as INTRAC.

Methodologically, it is based on 4 field trips to OXFAM development projects in the South, identifying peacebuilding openings and implications for Oxfam's work.

### **Comment**

This study gives a very useful introduction to peacebuilding and conflict prevention principals, approaches and instruments and how they can be adopted to the conditions of existing development projects aiming at poverty alleviation in close co-operation with local NGOs and communities. Empirically, it is of a special interest, as it covers projects not situated in the directly conflict affected parts of the country but in the South of the country, where violent conflict was started by a JVP upheavals in the 70ies. What is largely left out is a more detailed analysis how these projects are imbedded in policy making and policy implementing processes on a meso and macro level.

In comparison with the CARE (2000a) article on Do No Harm experiences and the Demusz (2000) paper on the methodology of listening to the displaced, this report has the advantage of introducing the reader to conflict prevention and transformation instruments on a much broader level and taking development projects from the often neglected South as case studies.

## CARE / Sri Lanka (2000a): The Concept and Tools of Do No Harm: Experiences of CARE Sri Lanka, Colombo. Draft.

### Table of Contents

- I. The Do No Harm Concept and its Working Tools
- II. The Impact of DNH on Decisions on Welfare Centers, IDPs, and Land Tenure
- III. The Impact of DNH on Programming
- IV. Advocacy
- V. DNH and the LRSP
- VI. Final Considerations

The first section is a short introduction to the Do No Harm Concept (DNH) and its tools. The second section focuses on the impact of Do No Harm on Welfare Centers, Internally Displaced People (IDPs), and Land Tenure. Regarding the welfare centers e.g. in Vavuniya, the DNH process inside CARE lead to the decision of totally withdrawing from these, as welfare centers were used by the SLA as human shields against LTTE attacks.

On the issue of the settlement and resettlement of IDPs, a very conscious questioning whether the objective of the movement is a concern for their security, a desire for a long-run solution or a manipulation of the ethnic composition in a region, was initiated by the DNH approach. Furthermore, as aid agencies might exacerbate tensions among old and new occupants by supporting resettlement, CARE decided to be very strict in verifying ownership of plots included in a project and refrains from building infrastructure on land where ownership is in question.

The third section focuses on the impact of DNH on internal programming. It influences the selection and relation with its approximately 120 partner NGOs and CBOs as they get regularly ranked according to their sensitivity with regard to the potential diversion of funds to the conflict, and negative impacts on neighboring communities. With regard to the administrative and decision making procedures CARE now focuses on reaching maximum transparency, e.g. share the responsibility for project approval and partner selection with District Review Boards. Additionally, decision-making on the question who gets what, are now much more consciously taken with regard to promote connectors on the community level. Finally, DNH lead to the development of a new

program series Vulnerable Groups Organized in Conflict Areas (VOICE), which aims to strengthen local institutions, community reconciliation capacities and decision-making bodies through training.

In the last section the objectives of the new country strategy are elaborated somewhat, which aims at a shift from pure poverty alleviation to helping the poor to become active participants and to tackle the root causes of marginalization and exclusion.

### **Main Argument / Methodology**

The main argument is that in the course of introducing the Do No Harm approach to the formulation of organizational policies and to the restructuring of programme and project procedures, important improvements, e.g. in partner selection were obtained. Methodologically, this report is based on personal communication and practical experience of the author.

#### **Comment**

This is a helpful summary of both the experiences of the Do No Harm Concept turned into a training course, as well as with regard to how CARE project practices in the Northeast changed due to internal and external awareness making processes. Certainly, in the framework of a short report there is no space to contribute too much to the question, how practices could look like at all with regard to CARE Sri Lanka's new vision statement "CARE will be a leader in sustaining local efforts to promote reconciliation".

In comparison with Demusz (2000) report on the Listening to the Displaced methodology, this paper has the advantage to elaborate more the results of the Do No Harm experience which was generated over the last two years with regard to OXFAM's country programming strategies.

Demusz (2000): *Listening to the Displaced - Action Research in the Conflict Zones of Sri Lanka*. Oxford.

#### Table of Contents

- I. A history of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka
- II. Why listen to the displaced?
- III. How to listen to the displaced: methodology
- IV. Things to consider when researching displacement
- V. Analysis
- VI. Outcomes
- VII. Lessons Learned

Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction to the history of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and describes the context and activities of humanitarian relief work in the Wannai and Jaffna.

Chapter 2 describes why the new approach of "listen to the displaced" (LTD) was developed and why it is important for donors, government officials, policy makers, local NGOs, humanitarian aid workers, and for the target community itself. One important argument for the LTD approach is the lack of detailed and unbalanced information from the conflict areas. Public media is severely limited and other informants, e.g. local NGOs tend to be heavily influenced by, and in some cases controlled by, the LTTE. Another is, that displaced communities have hardly any forum to be heard and that donors, government officials, and policy makers often do not have direct access to displaced/refugee populations.

Chapter 3 describes the methodology of "listen to the displaced" in some detail. It ranges from semi-structured interviews, focus-group discussions, brainstorming to small-group work.

Chapter 4 presents the necessary preparations and points that have to be taken into account for starting a LTD process, e.g. training needs for moderators, working with children, gender issues, choosing research participants, sampling methods and selecting the research team.

Chapter 5 is describing the process how to analyze the results, stressing that field workers should be involved in the initial analysis. Chapter 6 presents central outcomes of research conducted in the Wannu. LTD helped identify the most urgent needs of the people, which are due to the conflict dynamics sometimes changing very rapidly. Furthermore, more detailed knowledge, how coping mechanisms work, how people's capacities are perceived, what impact past interventions had, what future interventions should bring about, was thereby obtained.

Chapter 7 is focusing on lessons learned, describing the strengths of the LTD process, as well as the weaknesses and the future of LTD. On the latter, a reporting back to the communities is planned as well as expanding the process to include other INGOs and local NGOs.

### **Main Argument / Methodology**

Starting with the problem analysis, that the international relief and development aid systems are hardly sensitive to the voices of the target groups themselves, a particular methodology is developed, how to systematically listen to displaced people in the Wannu. It is shown how the results improve the planning and programming of relief work as well as how it can improve advocacy work for the most vulnerable groups in the Wannu. Methodologically, qualitative action research was conducted in a variety of communities hosting internally displaced people in the Wannu and Jaffna from 1996 to 1998. It is based on the first series of annual surveys, to assess the effectiveness of Oxfams relief efforts in Sri Lanka.

#### **Comment**

This report is introducing a very flexible and context sensitive method how to evaluate and improve the programming and functioning of relief work in conflict areas. Furthermore, the descriptions and examples of the experiences with and conditions for relief work in the Wannu is very interesting and timely. Yet, as many of the results of the analysis show, the micro-political dynamics and conflicts on the local level, as well as the role of formal and informal institutions in the communities as and in relation to regional institutions are not sufficiently taken into account. While this paper is not using an as comprehensive perspective, as taken by Lewer, or the OXFAM paper on Do no Harm experiences, with regard to its direct applicability to development projects in the war-torn areas of Sri Lanka, this paper has its strengths.

**Klem (2001): Between War and Suffering - Dilemmas of assistance in war-torn Sri Lanka, Nijmegen, Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen, Internal Version.**

#### **Table of Contents**

1. The Sri Lankan Case
2. Conceptual Background to Do No Harm
3. Case 1: Social Relations and Stability in Nilaveli Welfare Centre
4. Working in the Village in LTTE controlled area
5. Human Shielding in Thenmarachi: Home at last or back to the Front?
6. Drawing Lessons and Conclusions

After a brief but up-to date summary of the history of the conflict in Sri Lanka, the humanitarian consequences of the war and the role of donor agencies, the author gives a short introduction to Mary Anderson's Do No Harm approach. Trying to make its core applicable to the situation development projects in disputed territories in the Northeast, he develops four basic assumptions under which conditions development aid contributes to the conflict on the local level. In two case studies on the work of the Dutch aid organization ZOA Refugee Care in the Nilaveli Welfare Center and in a LTTE controlled village on the East Coast, Klem discusses the Do No Harm issues of social organization and security in a camp as well as the LTTE benefiting from a village credit project. A third case study deals with the role of aid agencies in the process of resettlement in a recently recaptured land strip in the North of Sri Lanka.

#### **Main Argument / Methodology**

Klem elaborates the ambiguous and intertwined nature of the dilemmas aid agencies are facing, who engage in development oriented humanitarian aid in the 'gray areas' of the conflict. He draws the conclusion that aid organizations should develop a political and context sensitive 'educated pragmatism' that works on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, they should take Do No Harm Issues into account, balancing them against other core concerns of relief work, while staying away from attempting to tackle conflict issues at a more general level. Besides interviews with country wide experts from a variety of organizations, the case studies are based on non-structured interviews and personal exploration in the villages.

### **Comment**

Due to focusing on the project level, the author manages to give a very detailed, very informative and critical account on the complex relationship of how social processes in the communities and project activities interrelate and can become problematic. He discusses what room for maneuver is there for actors willing to actively become involved for peacebuilding. Regarding the latter, his somewhat pessimistic outlook that development aid should stick to strengthening coping mechanisms seems justified with regard to the necessary training of project staff. With regard to the need of coordinating the different policy levels on which development aid is active, it is not a sufficiently political conscious approach. Methodological, this is mirrored in the disregard of macro- and meso- political issues of the conflict dynamics.

## CARE Sri Lanka / Meyer (2000b): Household Livelihood Security Assessment in LTTE-controlled Areas of the Wannai, Colombo.

### Table of Contents

1. Background and Objectives
2. Assessment Methodology
3. Assessment Findings
4. Low Potential Agricultural Communities
5. High Potential Agricultural Communities
6. Fishing Communities
7. Resettlement Villages
8. Conclusions and Interpretation of the Findings
9. Recommendations  
for next steps

Firstly, the background and objectives of the rapid household livelihood security assessment (RLSA) for the LTTE-controlled areas of the Wannai and an introduction to the assessment methodology is given.

A second section presents the findings ordered by low and high potential agricultural communities, fishing communities and resettlement villages. Internally displaced people (IDPs) were identified as the most vulnerable groups, estimated to a total number of 200.000, living in welfare centers, settlement schemes and mixed communities. These groups are highly food insecure and face a labour deficit in comparison to the other community members. The conflict impacts all groups in the Wannai, but has the greatest economic impact on fishing communities.

Finally, there is an interpretation section as well as recommendations for next steps of the NGOs and INGOs active in providing humanitarian aid in this area, aiming at reforming and expanding their programming. One example is the possibility of establishing a food security monitoring system.

### Main Argument / Methodology

One central argument, elaborated by this report, and of major interest from a conflict sensitive perspective is the question of the relationship of residence and IDP

households, on which the report concludes that IDP do not suffer extreme discrimination. But at the same time they do not enjoy the rights and benefits of fully empowered members of their communities and there are reports on some cases of community-internal conflicts. Some recommendations on how humanitarian agencies could reform and expand their programming is provided.

Methodologically, this study is based on qualitative data (interviews, group discussions) collection in 12 villages of the Wannu, randomly chosen but pre-grouped on the above categories and geographically distributed over the whole area. The assessment identifies and describes groups of greatest vulnerability and analyses causes of their vulnerability, as well as assets, opportunities and institutional resources.

#### **Comment**

This is the first socio-economic assessment of the situation of communities in the LTTE-controlled area, which can be considered representative. Therefore, it is a brief but valuable input for a better understanding of the living conditions in directly conflict-affected communities and can serve for a contextually more sensitive programming of humanitarian aid and development measures in the Wannu. Unfortunately, a thorough assessment of the institutional frameworks in the communities, especially the functioning of local associations, was not fully accomplished.