

Peer-advice seminar in Nepal:
Exploring South African experience with post-war military integration
A visit of South African leaders to Kathmandu, December 17 – 20, 2008

Introduction

This seminar was organised within the framework of the project “Resistance/Liberation Movements and Transitions to Politics”, run by the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (BRC) and Berghof Foundation for Peace Support (BFPS) in Berlin (Germany).

Its purpose was two-fold:

- ***Present some lessons-learnt from South Africa*** regarding political negotiations over military and security-related matters, and in particular the integration of statutory and non-statutory armies, in the context of a peace process and democratic transition.
- ***Facilitate discussions among Nepali leaders*** (mostly Maoist politicians and People’s Liberation Army commanders, but also representatives from the other political parties and commanders of the Nepali Army) regarding the future of the PLA, its process of integration into the NA, and more broadly the cornerstones of a national defence and security strategy.

1. Background information

One of the most contentious current challenges of the promising Nepali peace process is related to the future of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the military organisation of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – CPN(M). The main parties struggle over the key questions of whether, how and according to what criteria the PLA should be integrated into the Nepali Army (NA) or other security forces. Furthermore, the question of integration of the PLA is linked to other issues, such as the prevalence of other militias and armed groups, and a broader debate on the cornerstones of a national defense strategy.

Against this background, the South African experience offers some interesting insights into the challenges and dimensions of military integration. As in Nepal, the national liberation movement ANC was the governing power during the integration process after 1994. The successful military transition was based, *inter alia*, on a non-partisan approach towards the future armed forces and an interactive planning process outlining a joint vision of the country’s future.

The exchange of concrete experiences and peer-advice is one of the objectives of the project “Liberation/Resistance Movements and Transitions to Politics”, to which both the CPN(M) and ANC have taken part in the past. In this framework, discussions were held with a number of senior leaders of CPN(M) in Nepal in October 2008, including the Minister of Peace and Reconstruction Mr. Janardan Sharma, and the head of CPN(M)’s International Bureau C.P. Gajurel, who both took great interest in gaining some detailed and practical insights on the South African process of military negotiations and army integration, and strongly endorsed our proposal to invite South African leaders to Nepal. This issue was also positively discussed with the Peace and Conflict Management Committee, a high-level civil society platform representing the major political groupings in Nepal. A subsequent round of discussions with senior ANC leaders in South Africa in late October underlined that there is a mutual interest in sharing lessons, and that the experience of officers from the old apartheid army (SADF),

who played a crucial role in the success and sustainability of transition processes, should be also included. On the base of these preparatory discussions, a peer-advice seminar was organised in Nepal on December 17-20.

In line with the overall project goals, the purpose of this “peer-advice” exercise was not to teach prescriptive or generic lessons on military integration and security transition, but rather to inspire the ongoing debate among Nepali political and military leaders through an exchange and sharing of direct experience of what worked best (or less successfully) in the South African context, by those who were in the driving seat of the transition process. The underlying assumption guiding this process is that leaders currently engaged in conflict transformation tend to be more receptive to lessons-learnt and advice from experienced actors who went through comparable processes in their own context, whom they empathise with and trust as “peers”, than to scholarly or technical lectures by outside “experts”. In this case, it was particularly important to inform various stakeholders in Nepal about a highly successful case of post-war army integration which was relatively unknown, especially by some parties officially claiming that “nowhere in the world has a rebel army been integrated into the statutory armed forces”.

The three *South African participants* were former military commanders representing the two main opposing sides of the armed struggle, the ANC’s military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the South African Defence Force (SADF), and who became directly involved at the highest level in political and security negotiations, and the planning and implementation of military integration into a new national army, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).

- *Siphiwe Nyanda* joined MK in 1974, served as a field commander in the 1980s, and was appointed MK Chief of Staff in 1992. He then served on the Transitional Executive Council that oversaw the change of government in 1994, before transferring to the SANDF, into which MK was incorporated in 1994. He served successively as Chief of Defence Force Staff (1994-1996), General Officer commanding Gauteng Command (1996-1997), Deputy Chief of the SANDF (1997-1998), and Chief of the SANDF (1998-2005). General Nyanda is presently a member of the ANC’s National Working Committee and National Executive Committee.
- *Aboobaker (“Rashid”) Ismail* trained in the military field in the German Democratic Republic, and successively served as an MK chief instructor, Commander of Special Operations (after 1983) and Chief of Ordnance of the Military High Command of MK (after 1987). Upon his return to South Africa in 1990, he became a key negotiator in the military negotiations that resulted in the formation of the new SANDF. In 1994 he was appointed as a Major General in the SANDF and later became Chief of Policy and Planning with the rank of Deputy Director General.
- *Andre Bestbier* joined the SADF in 1964, and served as an operational commander at various levels during conventional, counter insurgency and special operations conducted in Southern Africa. After the democratic transition, he was directly involved in the integration of the statutory and non-statutory forces into the new SANDF as Commanding Officer of the Orange Free State Command. In 1995, he became Director of Operations and later Chief Director Operations at SA Joint Operations Headquarters. Major General Bestbier was also responsible for the planning and conduct of the largest peacekeeping training exercise (Blue Crane) in Africa.

In *Nepal*, the seminar’s agenda was developed together with the local hosts and project partners, in particular the Minister for Peace and Reconciliation and other CPN(M) and PLA leaders, in accordance with their specific peer-advice needs and interests. Additional meetings were also convened with other political forces, former and current Nepali Army officers, and relevant civil society leaders (journalists, scholars and military experts). Finally, the South African delegates were also invited to participate in the opening session of a joint confidence-building meeting with representatives from most political and military forces in Pokhara, Western Nepal.

The *Berghof Center*, represented by Oliver Wils (BFPS) and Veronique Dudouet (BRC), was responsible for the organisation and facilitation of the seminar, with the support of the civil society initiative NTTP project, the Swiss peacebuilding advisor in Nepal, the national peace facilitators, and the journalist Kiyoko Ogura. Further agenda details and a list of participants can be found at the end of this report.

Finally, besides the direct exchange of lessons-learnt, some *preparatory and follow-up reading* was also produced, compiled and distributed, both in print and on CD-Rom, among South African and Nepal participants, in order to further their understanding of their counterparts' context, conflict resolution and security transition processes.

2. Topics which arose from the discussions

A. Main features of the conflict and transformation process: similarities and differences

- *Causes and nature of conflict:* In South Africa, the conflict was born out of a socio-political struggle for racial equality and democracy engaged by an oppressed majority against a ruling minority. In Nepal, the Maoist struggle was primarily class-based and ideological (communist). The coalition which brought down the king was a strategic temporary alliance between forces fighting for different causes, which partly explains the weakness of the present political system, once the common enemy has been defeated.
- *Ratio between the two main armed forces:* the figures in both contexts are notably similar, with approx. 100,000 troops on the army's side at the height of the conflict, with 20,000 to 30,000 combatants on the insurgency's side.
- *Arms at the service of politics:* Both the ANC and CPN(M) were primarily political movements, which at some point in time adopted armed strategies as a means to mobilise the population and further their objectives; armed struggle was never an end in itself. This facilitated their transition to non-violent politics: they had a strong political leadership, and the movement's adaptation to party politics was not a major challenge.
- *Impetus for negotiations:* In both countries, the decision to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict was primarily political, and did not result from a military defeat by either side. But in Nepal, there is still a lot of mistrust as to the real motives of the Maoists, and many political opponents think that for the CPN(M), non-violent politics is only a tactical manoeuvre on the way to pursuing its ultimate goal of a one-party socialist regime.
- *Ownership of the process:* Both peace processes were nationally led and proceeded without any major external interference.

B. Transitional structures and processes

- *South Africa:*
 - The leaders of armed forces of the two major political actors, the South African government and the ANC, started engaging in informal dialogue as early as 1990, in parallel with the beginning of political talks (for purposes of confidence-building and to assess one's counterparts ahead of official negotiations). But they only became involved in official, structured negotiations in 1993.
 - Although the 1991 National Peace Accord did not contain any provisions related to the military, the 1993 interim constitution had security-related components, written by military commanders from both sides, which defined the nature and role of the future new national

army: e.g. shift from conscription to professional army, voluntary-based integration, unitary army, non-partisanship, civilian oversight.

- The planning of the military integration process then proceeded as such: in 1993, the Sub-Council on Defence of the Transitional Executive Council established a Joint Monitoring Coordinating Council, co-chaired by the Minister of Defence and chiefs of staff from both the MK and SADF: this represented the first act of top-down integration. In turn, it set up five working groups (finance, intelligence, logistics, operations, and personnel). The whole planning process took only six months (late 1993-early 1994), and was concluded in time for the first democratic elections in 1994; the joint guard of honour during the inauguration of President Mandela represented the first, symbolic act of new army. The full implementation of military integration was then carried out over the next few years, according to principles and measures set out in the 1996 White Paper, 1998 Defence Review and 2002 Defence Act.

- ***Nepal:***

- In Nepal, the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the 2007 interim constitution did not specify the modalities of security transition processes, and only offered a vague list of options. Both texts refer to the necessity to “supervise, integrate and rehabilitate the Maoist combatants” and the formation of a Special Committee. The interim constitution also states that “the Council of Ministers shall (...) formulate an extensive plan for the democratisation of the Nepal Army and implement it”. A separate text signed the same month as the CPA, the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, mentions a “possible integration into the security forces”.
- An Army Integration Special Committee (AISC) was formed in October 2008, but its convening was delayed by several months due to inter-party disputes over its composition. There seem to be two current negotiation tracks over security transition arrangements: informal confidence-building measures, and official discussions at the AISC. Both take place at the political level, and there is no direct dialogue between the two military leaderships.
- The next step will be the formation of a unified command structure under the AISC, and the convening of technical working groups to operationalise the army integration and rehabilitation process.

C. Relations between security and political transition

- ***Civilian oversight and political control over security transition:***

- Decisions over the role, functions and transformation of the army should be taken by the political leadership, i.e. the President, Defence Minister, and Defence Committee in the Parliament. The army is accountable to the executive and legislative branches of government, and should respect their decisions. Moreover, change will be more sustainable if it is decided in consensus with, and accepted by, the opposition.
- Conversely, political leaders should not interfere in army matters beyond the law, and decisions regarding the technicalities over army integration (ranks, army size, standards, etc) should be left to the army.
- The importance of the political leadership in times of transition was stressed by many Nepalis, in reference to what they called the “Mandela factor” in South Africa. Leaders should not allow the transition process to be disrupted by acts of violence. The South Africans recalled the assassination of MK chief of staff Chris Hani in April 1993 as a

decisive pressure point which convinced them not to wait any longer to conclude the peace process.

- With a proper, inclusive framework, everything can be decided very quickly. There should be direct engagement between the most relevant leaders of major parties, outside of public pressure. What hinders effective and consensual decision-making in Nepal is the vast number of political parties (around 50), and the lack of political trust between the two main parties (CPN(M) and NC).

- ***Army non-partisanship:***

- In South Africa, the new army's Code of Conduct had a strict rule of non-interference in politics. This does not mean that soldiers should be a-political: according to the Bill of Rights which stresses the freedom of association, every individual is allowed to be member of a political party. However, to prevent conflicts of interest, members of the armed forces should not exhibit their political preferences in their military duties, nor can they occupy a public position in a political party. For instance, Gen. Nyanda resigned from the ANC's Executive Committee when he joined the new SANDF.
- In Nepal, one of the main points of contention by the opposition parties and NA leadership is their refusal to integrate "ideologically-indoctrinated combatants" into the army. They fear that other soldiers will get "contaminated" by the Maoist ideology cultivated by the PLA, which, they claim, continues to "indoctrinate" its troops in the cantonments. Maoists retort that it is impossible to deny one's ideology, and in fact the state army is also political: just like the SADF in South Africa was supporting the ideology of apartheid, the NA has been ideologically trained to serve the monarchy. However, at the Pokhara meeting, PLA commanders stressed that they are even "one step ahead of the South African model": they accept that their combatants will forfeit their political party membership when integrating the new army.
- *Building a new Nation:* Army integration and military reform are crucial steps in post-war peace and democratisation processes. The new defence forces should be at the service of the nation, inspire confidence and pride, and play a major role in building nationhood and a new national identity: therefore, they should be seen as non-partisan. Maoists want the new army to help "building a new Nepal", just like the SANDF reflects a multi-cultural, democratic South Africa.

- ***Sequencing in military and political transitions:***

- The demobilisation of combatants is a gradual process, reciprocated by parallel political steps and reforms: In South Africa, combatants were sent to assembly points early on but were not formally disarmed until the prospect of democratic change was secured by the 1994 elections. In Nepal, the cantonment of combatants and the weapons collection process took place at the same time as the formation of transitional political structures.
- Similarly, SSR and military integration should not take place before there is enough political trust between the parties. Maoists should thus take seriously the claim made by the NA and opposition parties that prior to engaging an integration process, the government should indicate through its actions that it is genuinely committed to multi-party democracy and to honouring its past agreements.

D. Inclusiveness of the integration process

- ***A “liberal” model:*** The South African model of army integration was described as “very liberal” by NA veterans, because every combatant from the liberation forces was given the right to join the new army. All declared armed factions, including the smallest ones, were invited to join military negotiations, and even those who did not take part (i.e. APLA) were later invited to integrate the new army. An exception was made for ‘surrogate forces’ of the apartheid regime which never declared themselves as armed forces: a few of them were accepted into the army, but only at basic entry level. In total, 17,000 combatants from the liberation forces (out of 28,000) integrated the army.
- The NA argues that no such model has ever been applied on the Asian continent. It also claims that the model cannot be transferred to the Nepali context, since unlike the ANC, the CPN(M) does not represent 90% of the population - it gained ‘only’ 30% at the CA elections. By contrast, the Maoists claim that all (or most) PLA combatants want to join the army, and they should be offered this choice; the military forces will become over-sized for a small country like Nepal (with 120,000 members initially), but can then be right-sized later on.
- ***Importance of mixed formations:*** against the argument put forward by some Nepalis that PLA forces should not integrate the army but mainly demobilise or join separate security branches, the South Africans retorted that inviting all forces which participated in the conflict to join a new national security apparatus makes it easier to “control” them. Otherwise, if they remain on their own as separate factions, they will become more easily tempted to block the peace consolidation process or keep their old political allegiances. It was also argued that confidence-building and mutual trust among soldiers will arise through working and fighting together in integrated, mixed units, which fosters a spirit of comradeship. Therefore, the parties should not try to preserve distinct units.
- ***Inclusion of ‘late joiners’?*** In Nepal, the formation of multiple splinter groups in the Terai region, and of urban Maoist militias outside the cantonments (i.e. the Young Communist League), illustrate this need for an inclusive process: postponing the integration of combatants increases defections and uncertainly. However, there remain some problems regarding the militants who took up arms after the signature of the peace agreement: they are not included in the ongoing UN-monitored demobilisation process, and it is debatable whether they should all be invited to integrate the new army.
- ***Parity of the decision-making process:*** during collaborative military planning of the integration process, decisions should be taken by consensus rather than vote. This meant, in the case in South Africa, that although the state forces were numerically more important than liberation forces in the JMCC working groups, numbers mattered less than the ability to engage and convince.
- ***Role of female combatants:*** the South Africans were asked by several Nepalis whether women had also been integrated into the new army. In fact, in the SANDF several former female commanders became generals, and gender equality was improved by allowing women to join combat units, which was not possible in the SADF.

E. Mechanisms of military integration

- ***Absorption versus integration:***
 - In South Africa, the creation of a new entity, the SADF, to replace the old SANDF, was accompanied by a complete *transformation of the security system*, including the

formulation of a new strategy (e.g. decision that the army should not play any role internally), code of conduct, uniforms, medal systems, etc.

- In Nepal, Maoists advocate a similar path, and call for the transformation and democratisation of the army. By contrast, the NA claims that unlike the apartheid army in South Africa, it is already relatively inclusive and committed to democratic norms, and that Nepal not being a “failed state”, a complete army restructuration process is not necessary. Besides, there have already been some changes since the end of the Monarchy, when the Royal Nepali Army became the Nepali Army.
 - During the visit, the South Africans argued that a transformation of the army will be inevitable, and insisted on the importance of *change management*: army leaders should be prepared for change, and communicate upcoming reforms at all army echelons, to thus reduce the level of uncertainty among the troops.
- ***Army incorporation criteria:***
- In South Africa, the professional standards for the recruitment and ranking of soldiers were voluntarily suspended during the integration of liberation troops, and temporarily replaced by “special criteria” allowing for unconventional types of experience and skills to be recognised. The ranking system was based on the new officers’ ability to command, level of responsibilities in the former guerrilla army, practical experience, etc. The liberation forces ranked their own commanders; for instance, MK headquarters leaders became generals in the SADF. This self-ranking process was verified through tests and evaluations, with assistance from a British Military Advisory and Training Team.
 - In Nepal, past agreements state that “those who fulfil the terms and conditions of security force can be integrated”. This vague provision is interpreted very differently by the various parties. The army wants to maintain its old professional standards, on the basis of which most Maoist combatants would be disqualified. It also insists that integration should be a voluntary individual choice, guaranteed by individual private counselling by an independent (e.g. international) monitoring body. It believes that the sequence of ‘free choice’ should be to first offer rehabilitation, then integration into new force(s), and then integration into existing forces as a last resort. Finally, it also upholds a policy of “one weapon, one candidate” (with the type of weapon determining the type of security force to be incorporated into), and insists on integrating Maoist combatants at “basic entry level” - below officer ranks. By contrast, the Maoists want their combatants to be incorporated collectively (by unit), and with recognition of their years of experience and abilities on the battleground.
 - The three South Africans agreed that the leadership capacities of the Maoist commanders should be recognised and used as criteria for determining their ranks in the army; if they were not qualified, they would not have been able to lead their 20,000 combatants to fight on equal terms with a 100,000 strong army with sophisticated weapons and powerful foreign allies.
- ***Training schemes:***
- When liberation troops, who have been trained for guerrilla warfare, join a conventional army, they need to go through intense re-training programmes to adjust their skills to a new environment. In South Africa, MK veterans had to enrol on basic training courses to rectify gaps in their background qualifications or experience, lasting for up to 2 years, which became a source of frustration for many liberation cadres. But in order to preserve a parity of treatment, members of the old army were also subjected to re-training schemes,

including diversity training (to learn about the cultures and languages of their new colleagues). In Nepal, the Maoists also demand a reciprocal re-skilling process with democratisation training for NA soldiers in parallel with professionalisation training for PLA combatants.

▪ ***Army right-sizing:***

- In South Africa, the army first expanded its size by integrating all liberation fighters willing to join its ranks, while a commission was established to determine its optimal size. Then, the number of troops was progressively reduced through a complementary process of attractive early retirement packages, natural attrition, or the demission of those, on both sides, who were not prepared to change and adapt to their new environment.
- In Nepal, the Maoists also support such a scheme, while the NA would prefer to follow a model of simultaneous downsizing and integration. However, the South Africans insisted that everyone should be first offered the choice to join any security sector of their choice.

▪ ***Integration into other security sectors:***

- In South Africa, parts of the liberation troops also integrated other institutions such as the police, intelligence services and service brigades (civic action teams working on road construction and other infrastructure development projects). But the official position of the Maoists in Nepal is that their combatants are “fit for the army” and should only join the defence forces. They seem to dismiss the importance of other security sectors. On the contrary, the NA and opposition parties (i.e. Nepali Congress) would prefer to see Maoists incorporated into a separate new force (e.g. industrial force, border control force etc). Here again, the South Africans reminded their interlocutors of the importance of mixed, integrated formations, in order to break old political allegiances and build cohesive and inclusive security forces.

F. Demobilisation and reintegration (“rehabilitation”) programs:

Since the topic of the seminar was related to issues around military integration, the challenges of demobilisation and reintegration (also called “rehabilitation” in Nepali legal texts) for combatants returning to civilian lives were not addressed in depth during the meetings. There were brief discussions related to the following points:

- ***Cantonment process and challenges of defection:*** for instance, the Maoists who left the camps to take part in the 2008 electoral campaign are now unable to re-enter them, and will thus have problems to be included in the rehabilitation programmes.
- ***Demobilisation packages:*** In South Africa, the combatants who transferred into the party after the transition received a demobilisation package, while those who took on civilian careers received a training package. Those who were too old to integrate the army were granted recognition of their services and went directly into early retirement. In Nepal, negotiations are still ongoing on these issues.

3. Summary: List of 10 recommendations

- There is *no solution outside the political arena*. There should be a strict separation of tasks, with politicians taking the decisive step to allow military integration to happen. There also needs to be some *civilian oversight* over the army in order to guarantee its democratisation.
- On the other hand, politicians should leave the decisions regarding the technicalities of the integration process (criteria, standards, training, army right-sizing etc) under the responsibility of a *technical committee* made up of military leaders and commanders.
- There needs to be a clear *legal framework*: the new Constitution should spell out the general modalities of integration and the main features of the new army.
- *The new army should be politically non-partisan*; but members of the armed forces, as any citizen, have the right to a political opinion, provided that they not exhibit it in their military duties.
- In order to address the lack of political trust between all major parties (e.g. the CPN(M) and NC, or the PLA and NA), there should be *more direct engagement* between them, in the form of informal confidence-building measures, in a secluded location isolated from intra-party and public pressure. The Pokhara seminar and the readiness of all participants to share lessons from the South African experience together was a positive sign that there is some readiness for such dialogue.
- Integration should be offered as an *individual independent choice*, with attractive options for rehabilitation. Everyone has the right to choose to join the army, other security sector, or demobilise (into politics or civilian life).
- The transition process as well as the new security forces should be as *inclusive* as possible in order to increase a broad ownership and to maintain all former combatants under control.
- There should be *mixed formations* (merging of old PLA / NA units) in the new army, to avoid the maintenance of separate allegiances. Confidence-building and mutual trust within the new army will arise through working and fighting together as integrated units.
- *Change management*: there will be necessarily be some major changes, and the parties should be ready for these and accompany them rather than be forced to react afterwards.
- *Internal communication*: The major decisions regarding the process, modalities and timeframe of integration need to be communicated internally to all levels of hierarchy of the army and liberation forces. This will allow keeping all forces on board during the long transition process, even at times when the troops fail to see progress and results on the short-term.

4. List of meetings and participants

17 December 08

National Facilitators

Mr Padma Ratna Tuladhar

Mr Daman Nath Dhungara

Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

Mr Chandra Prasad Gajurel (Gaurab), Member of the Central Secretariat and In-charge of Foreign Department

Mr Netra Bikram Chand (Biplab), Member of the Central Secretariat and In-charge of Class Organisations

Mr Kul Prasad K.C. (Sonam), Member of the Central Committee and In-charge of the Young Communist League

Mr Dharmendra Bastola, Member of the Central Committee and In-charge of Seti-Mahakali State Committee

Ms Amrita Thapa Magar, General Secretary of All Nepal Women's Association (Revolutionary)

N.N., Member Foreign Department

Ms Kiyoko Ogura, Researcher and Journalist

Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction

Mr Janardan Sharma (Prabhakar), Minister, former deputy commander PLA

Mr Madhav Ghimire, Secretary

Journalists

Mr Ajaya Bhadra Khanal, Editor The Himalayan

Mr Yubaraj Ghimire, Editor Newsfront

18 December 08

Civil Society and Parliamentarians

Mr DB Gurung, Executive Director, Friends for Peace

N.N., 3 board members, Friends for Peace

Prof Dr Indrajit Rai, Military Expert, Member of Constituent Assembly

Nepal Army

General (ret) CB Gurung

Major General (ret) Dilip Rana

General Rukmangad Katwal, Chief of Staff Nepal Army

Brigadier General Ramindra Chhetri, Director of public relations

N.N., 5 staff members Nepal Army

Nepali and international experts

Prof Dhruva Kumar, Security Sector Expert

Dr Kul Chandra Gautam, Security Sector Expert
Dr Bishnu Upreti, Regional Coordinator NCCR
Mr Geja Sharma Wagley, Security Sector Expert
Mr Markus Heiniger, Switzerland, Special Adviser for Peace Building in Nepal
Ms Kathryn Jones, Head of Political Affairs, UNMIN
Mr Jeffery Mapendere, UN Senior Mediation Advisor
Mr John Medina, UNMIN
Mr Peter Vanhoutte, DCAF, Nepal Programme Advisor
Ms Leena Rikkila, International Idea
Ms Michelle Parlevliet, DANIDA HUGOU
Dr Nicole Toepperwien, SDC
Mr Raj Kumar Neupane, SDC

19 December 08

Confidence-Building Workshop in Pokhara

General (ret) CB Gurung
Major General (ret) Dilip Rana
Mr Barsa Man Pun (Ananta), member CC, CPN (M), former deputy commander PLA
Mr Nanda Kishor Pun (Pasang), commander PLA
Mr Chandra Khanal, CPN (M), PLA
Mr Prayash Subedi, CPN (M), PLA
Mr Jayendra Thapa, CPN (M), PLA
Mr Khim Lal Devkota, CPN (M)
Mr Lila Mani Pokharel, People's Front Nepal
Ms Sarita Giri, NSP (A)
Mr BP Yadav, MPRF
Mr Pradeep Gyawali, CPN (UML)
Mr Hridayesh Tripathi, TMDP
Mr Padma Ratna Tuladhar, National Facilitator
Mr Daman Nath Dhungara, National Facilitator
Mr Vidyadhar Mallik, National Facilitator
Mr Bishnu Sapkota, NTTP Forum
Ms Sajana Maharjan, NTTP Forum

20 December 08

Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction

Mr Janardan Sharma (Prabhakar), Minister, former deputy commander PLA
Mr Durga Nidhi Sharma, Coordinator Emergency Peace Support Project